WEBER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/24/2015 11:27 AM

The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review and
the New Contingency of Bank Dividends
Robert F. Weber*
ABSTRACT
Historically, bank regulators have restricted bank dividends as part of a
larger effort to preserve banks’ capital and make them more able to withstand
losses. In today’s dynamic banking markets, the formulaic and rigid ways by
which regulators have traditionally policed dividends have become
anachronistic. Against this background, the Federal Reserve Board has
attempted to update and reinvigorate dividend regulation through two
regulatory reforms: (1) the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
(CCAR) program and (2) the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test program.
This Article will explore the important practical and theoretical
implications that result from these regulatory reforms. As a practical matter, the
ability of banks to make distributions—the most basic method by which equity
investors obtain returns on their capital investment—has been made contingent
and contestable to an unprecedented degree. For example, over the past two years
the Federal Reserve Board has required Bank of America, Citigroup, and
Goldman Sachs to adjust their dividend plans. In a privatized system of
banking, restrictions on the ability of stock investors to obtain returns potentially
complicate bank funding.
As for regulatory theory, these reforms are noteworthy because they unite,
for the first time, what had previously been two separate sub-systems of the bank
regulatory framework: the formal-mandatory dimension of bank regulation,
exemplified by the formulaic, automatic application of traditional dividend
restrictions, and the informal-discretionary dimension of bank regulation,
exemplified by the context-specific regulation of “unsafe and unsound practices”
and stress testing. These reforms provide further evidence of a broader trend in
financial regulation towards greater emphasis on hypothetical and conjectural
future stress scenarios. Finally, this Article links the CCAR program to the
existing “risk regulation” literature that has developed in the environmental,
health, and safety regulatory arenas. Although the risk regulation model has
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not yet taken hold in financial regulatory scholarship, the CCAR program
provides a clear example of its relevance to the regulatory tasks of bank
supervisors. By viewing the program through the risk regulatory lens, the Article
frames future research questions concerning the utility of applying the risk
regulatory model to risk-taking financial institutions.
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 44
II.WHY DIVIDENDS MATTER IN A PRIVATIZED SYSTEM OF FINANCE 51
III.THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANK DIVIDEND RESTRICTIONS.......... 56
A. In Early U.S. Banking Legislation, Dividend Legality
Depended on Rigid Accounting Metrics and
Compliance with Payments Obligations ..................... 57
B. Introducing Indeterminacy into Banking Law Through
the Term “Unsafe and Unsound Practices”:
Applications to Dividend Restrictions ........................ 65
IV.“PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION”: RIGID AND MANDATORY
INTERVENTION POINTS BASED ON ACCOUNTING-BASED
CAPITAL LEVELS................................................................... 68
V.TWO WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT BANK DIVIDEND REGULATION 71
A. The Formal-Mandatory Dimension of Bank Supervision
................................................................................ 73
B. The Informal-Discretionary Dimension of Bank
Supervision .................................................................. 75
C. Integrating the Informal-Discretionary Dimension into
the Broader Literature on “Risk Regulation” ............ 81
D. A Hypothetical Example: Hipobank’s Ukrainian
Operations ................................................................... 86
VI.INTRODUCING THE COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEW ................................................................................ 91
A. Mechanics of the CCAR Program ............................... 91
B. Early Experience of the CCAR Program .................. 102
VII.CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 108

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Civil War era, banking law in the United States has
restricted the ability of banks to pay dividends and make other
distributions of corporate property. The premise of dividend
regulation is that by limiting transfers of assets from banks and their
holding companies to their stockholders, bank regulators increase the
pool of capital that is available to absorb unexpected losses, thereby
making banks more resilient. More resilient banks, in turn, result in
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reduced demands on federal deposit insurance and other government
safety nets as well as a more stable financial system. Dividend
regulation figured prominently in all banking legislation from the late
nineteenth century through the New Deal era. In the decades that
followed the New Deal, Congress introduced new bank regulatory
systems—such as the policing of “unsafe and unsound practices” and
the “prompt corrective action” regime—that also provided for
dividend restrictions, though as part of much broader regulatory
reforms.
In recent decades, however, traditional dividend restrictions have
become anachronisms because the ways in which they were used have
proven too rigid and formulaic for a banking industry that has
undergone rapid change as a result of deregulation, increased
competition, and technological developments.1 In explaining the
irrelevance of traditional dividend regulation, other commentators
focus less on its shortcoming as a regulatory technology, and more on
regulatory capture, which critiques the ways in which regulators
implement those regulatory technologies.
Specifically, these
commentators argue that supervisors treat banks with a light touch in
order to curry favor with them for future employment, or on account
of a vaguer, but potentially more pernicious, form of “cultural” or
“social” capture that impedes their ability to perform their statutory
mandates in the public interest.2
1

See MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED—AND
HAVE STILL TO LEARN—FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 117–48 (2014) (arguing that the
financial system has become more unstable on account of liberalization, globalization,
innovation, leverage, and perverse incentives); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation
and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (providing magisterial history of the
wrenching changes in the financial services sector from 1975 to 2000).
2
See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 203–07 (2013) (discussing regulatory
capture problem in the banking industry more generally); IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 80,
90 (1992) (attributing regulatory capture in part to a desire for a “smoothly running
work life” and a distaste for confrontation); James Kwak, Cultural Capital and the
Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds. 2014) (discussing
“cultural capture”); Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, in MAINTAINING
STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 495, 601 (2009), available at
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/
sympos/2008/buiter031209.pdf?la=en (using the term “cognitive regulatory capture”
to describe phenomenon by which regulators “internali[ze], as if by osmosis, the
objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested interest they are meant to
regulate and supervise in the public interest”); Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation
as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. J. BUS. L. 643, 649–56 (2012) (theorizing
“complexity capture” as a “soft, hegemonic [form of regulatory] capture” in the
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Whatever its cause, the regulatory track record is incontrovertible:
in the lead up to the recent financial crisis, bank supervisors did not
restrict the steady outflow of funds from banks to their stockholders.
As weak signals of impending catastrophe piled up,3 regulators blithely
looked the other way as their supervised institutions became ever more
thinly capitalized. Incredibly, bank dividends increased steadily every
quarter from 2005 through 2007, and remained high throughout
2008—including late 2008, during which “the most unbelievable week
in America ever”4 brought the financial system to its knees.5
The failure of banking law and regulation to stanch the
hemorrhaging of bank capital is a historical fact. Dividend regulation
did not prevent or soften the impact of this most recent financial crisis.
But the regulation of dividends, if it can be implemented in an
effective manner, remains a useful tool, at least in theory, on account
of its simplicity. By restricting the ability of banks and their holding
companies to transfer capital to stockholders, dividend restrictions
ensure that there is greater loss-absorbing capital within the enterprise.
Better capitalized banks are more stable and resilient banks, and
dividend regulation can contribute to that result.6
This Article explains how the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve Board,” or “FRB”), the regulator
for banks at the holding company level, has recently attempted to
context of authentically complex regulated markets that affects “even virtuous, publicregarding regulators who are resistant to traditional capture efforts by industry”);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall
Street, 81 U. CIN. L.REV. 1283 (2013) (discussing regulatory capture problem in the
banking industry more generally); Steven M. Davidoff, The Government’s Elite and
Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/
06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture (describing “social capture”).
3
See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 34, 36 figs.2.2 & 2.3 (2013) (registering decline in
housing prices and housing starts in first quarter of 2006); id. at 90 (chronicling
liquidity crisis at BNP Paribas subprime mortgage money market funds on account of
evaporation of liquidity in that market).
4
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 2 (2010)
(quoting JPMorgan Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon during a morning meeting with
his management team after consulting with government officials about the impending
bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers and bailout of American International Group
Inc., or “AIG”).
5
See Beverly Hirtle, Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases During the
Financial Crisis, N.Y. FED. RESERVE BANK STAFF REPORT NO. 666, at 22 fig.1 (2014),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr666.pdf (showing dividends
paid by large bank holding companies from 20052009).
6
See Robert F. Weber, Post-Crisis Reforms and High Reliability Theory, 50 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (explaining how capital adequacy regulation is designed to
improve the resilience of supervised banks).
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reinvigorate dividend restrictions through two new regulatory
initiatives.7 And banks have taken notice. JPMorgan Chase & Co., the
largest bank holding company in the United States by assets, has
described this new, reinvigorated dividend regulation regime as the
“primary measure [that it] use[s] to assess [its] capital adequacy.”8 In
the summer of 2014, the Chief Financial Officer of The Goldman
Sachs Group Inc. told reporters it was “obvious” that these new
programs required the bank to change its business practices—in that
case, to scale back its profitable repurchase (or “repo”) lending
program—in order to preserve its ability to pay dividends.9 Under the
two new programs, the FRB has over the past four years ordered ten of
the largest banks in the world—a group that also includes Bank of
America, Inc., the second largest U.S. bank by assets—to cease
payments of dividends to their stockholders,10 cutting off the principal
means by which the stockholders expect to obtain a return on their
capital investment.11
The important novelty of these new regulatory initiatives is
underscored by the fact that each of these banks in the preceding
examples was well capitalized and in compliance with applicable
capital adequacy rules at the time of the regulatory interventions. The
problem, according to regulators, was a circumstance that only five
years earlier they would not be able to take into consideration: namely,
that even though these banks were perfectly well capitalized at the
time, they might run into trouble if imaginary and hypothetical adverse
conditions in the future economy and future financial markets were to
come to pass.
Taken together, these two new FRB regulatory programs
7

The new dividend restrictions that are the focus of this Article apply only to the
largest bank holding companies, known under the FRB’s new Regulation YY as
“covered companies.” See infra note 190–92 and accompanying text (explaining that
a “covered company” is a bank holding company with over fifty billion dollars in total
assets or a company designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council as
systemically important). Unless otherwise noted, references to “banks” and “bank
holding companies” should be read to refer to the term of art “covered companies” as
set forth in Regulation YY.
8
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 117 (Feb. 28, 2013),
available at http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/secfiling.cfm?filing
ID=19617-13-221 [hereinafter JPMorgan 10-K].
9
See Michael J. Moore, Goldman Sachs’s Stress-Test Stumble Leads to Repo Cut,
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2014, 3:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-07-15/goldman-sachs-s-stress-test-stumble-leads-to-repo-cut.
10
See infra note 273 and accompanying text (summarizing the effects on dividend
policy for those bank holding companies whose capital plans the FRB has rejected).
11
See infra note 18 (explaining the critical role of dividends for stockholder
returns).
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reinvigorate the traditional regulatory tool of dividend regulation by
combining it with the relatively new regulatory tool of stress testing.
The first of its initiatives, the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST)
program, requires banks to demonstrate their ability to withstand
economic and financial stress as reflected in hypothetical stress
scenarios involving adverse financial economic developments.12 The
second initiative, the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
(CCAR) program, requires a bank to submit a “capital plan” detailing
how it expects to ensure it will possess adequate capital over the
coming year, including any proposed plans to make dividends or other
distributions of bank property. If a bank is unable to demonstrate its
financial stability under the hypothetical stress conditions and after
giving effect to its planned capital actions, the FRB will reject the
capital plan and restrict its ability to pay dividends or make other
distributions. In evaluating the bank’s financial stability, the FRB
determines whether the bank would satisfy all regulatory capital
standards if the bank were to effectuate its proposed distributions or
dividends under the hypothetical and future stressed market conditions.
These developments shift the focus from traditional capital
regulation, under which regulators historically gauge compliance by
determining whether a bank presently satisfies applicable regulatory
capital standards under actual and current market conditions. The
regulatory lens is projected into the future on two accounts: on the one
hand, the FRB imagines adverse future economic and financial
conditions, and on the other hand, the FRB imagines the effects of the
bank’s future expectations to transfer capital (through dividends and
the like) outside of the company group.
This shift in focus has significance not only because the FRB has
exhumed and polished the traditional regulatory tool of dividend
regulation for a new use. It also unites, for the first time, what had
previously been two separate sub-systems of the bank regulatory
framework: the formal-mandatory dimension of bank regulation,
exemplified by the formulaic, automatic application of traditional
dividend restrictions and capital requirements, and the informaldiscretionary dimension of bank regulation, exemplified by the contextspecific policing of “unsafe and unsound practices” and stress tests.
Viewing dividend regulation through these formal-mandatory and
informal-discretionary lenses reveals a troubling state of affairs. On
the one hand, the formal-mandatory tools have become largely
12

On the practice and theory of stress testing as a regulatory tool, see Robert F.
Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236,
2237–44 (2014).
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obsolete because they rely too heavily on rigid accounting metrics to
police dynamic, flexible institutions, and they fail to consider how
dividends might affect a bank’s financial condition in light of future
contingencies. On the other hand, regulators exhibit hesitancy, even
unwillingness, to use informal-discretionary tools.
But dividend regulation is where the FRB has created a possible
solution to the problem.
The CCAR and DFAST programs
reinvigorate dividend regulation, a traditional formal-mandatory
regulatory tool, by taking into account hypothetical and conjectural
future stress scenarios, a clearly informal-discretionary tool.13 These
programs are both rigid and forward-looking. They allow regulators
to consider the effects of future hypothetical scenarios on a bank, but
also tether those scenarios to a system of rigid numerical trigger points
that require intervention by regulators.
Consequently, the ability of banks to make dividends and
distributions to their stockholders—the most basic method by which
equity investors obtain returns on their capital investment—has been
made contingent and contestable to an unprecedented degree. In a
jurisdiction relying on a privatized system of finance and banking,
private investors are responsible for providing equity and debt capital
to banks and other financial intermediaries. Restrictions on their
ability to obtain return on their investment therefore strikes at the
heart of this privatized system.14
Aside from its practical implications for banks and its innovations
in regulatory techniques, the CCAR program has further implications
for regulatory theory and practice. It provides an opportunity to
bridge some intramural divides separating sub-fields of administrative
law that historically have not interacted, in the process creating new
opportunities for learning and improved practice. In particular, this
Article describes how the CCAR program, and the informaldiscretionary dimension more broadly, adopts features of so-called
“risk regulation” regimes in the environmental, health, and safety
regulatory fields.
13

See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2014: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 1 (2014), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ccar_20140326.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 CCAR RESULTS] (“CCAR is also designed to help both the [bank
holding company] and the Federal Reserve evaluate whether a [bank holding
company’s] capital accretion and distribution decisions are prudent, given inherent
uncertainty about the future.”).
14
See Simon Johnson, Morgan Stanley Speaks: Against Relying on Capital Requirements,
BASELINESCENARIO (Nov. 24, 2009), http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/24/
morgan-stanley-speaks-against-relying-on-capital-requirements/.
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Risk regulation is a slippery moniker with a range of related, but
rarely identical, connotations. Nevertheless, any attempt to define risk
regulation starts with the burst of environmental, health, and safety
regulation that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The common thread
that ties these risk regulatory regimes together is that each requires
regulators to exercise their discretion in settings where scientific
uncertainty is unavoidable. The typical risk regulation regime consists
of (1) a statutory risk trigger that permits an agency to act on the basis of
anticipated, but uncertain, harm and (2) a statutory standard specifying
the level or stringency with which the agency should regulate the harm
and the factors it may consider in doing so.
The relevance of the risk regulation literature to the informaldiscretionary dimension of bank supervision should be apparent. In
both settings, the regulatory task requires the regulator to determine
whether a statutory trigger test has been met by referring to an
assessment of the risk that a future, uncertain outcome will transpire.
Moreover, both settings also necessitate a trade-off, guided by the
statutory standard, between protection against risks and the costs of
providing that protection.
Notwithstanding the evident parallels between risk regulation and
financial regulation and supervision, the idea that risk regulation is
really about protecting health, safety, and the environment—and, by
implication, not about protecting financial institutions and systems—
has proven sticky. In a sense, this stickiness is counterintuitive. After
all, financial regulatory systems are set up, among other things, for the
express purpose of regulating systemic risk and supervising the
institutions designed to create, take, and profit from risk. For purposes
of this Article, the important point is to register how this particular
corner of financial regulation resonates in perhaps unexpected ways
with well-established traditions in other administrative law settings.
Future research will undoubtedly advance our understanding of how
the informal-discretionary mode of banking supervision (including the
CCAR program and initiatives like it) fits into risk regulatory theory
more broadly.
This Article begins in Part II by explaining why dividends matter:
why they matter to stockholders, who look to them to obtain a return
on their investment, and why they matter to bank supervisors, who look
at them as a potential threat to the solvency of the bank and the
stability of the financial system. Part III provides a brief history of
regulatory restrictions on bank dividends, starting from the Civil War
era legislation until the present day. Part IV explains how the so-called
“prompt corrective action” regime revolutionized bank supervision
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and had served, since 1991 until these recent reforms, as the primary
statutory authorization for the use of governmental power to restrict
bank dividends. Part V offers some theoretical observations about the
bank supervisory system, distinguishing its formal-mandatory
dimension from its informal-discretionary dimension, both as a
historical matter and as a matter of regulatory technology. This Part
highlights in particular the open-ended, indeterminate, and
hypothetical aspects of the informal-discretionary dimension, and
explains why it historically contrasted sharply with the formalmandatory system, which consisted of rigid regulatory responses
calibrated to precise accounting metrics. It also explains how the
literature on “risk regulation”—a research program that has developed
in the environmental, safety, and health contexts, but has yet to take
hold in the financial regulatory context—provides a useful frame
within which to view financial regulatory programs that draw on the
informal-discretionary dimension. Finally, Part VI undertakes the first
comprehensive study of how the CCAR and DFAST programs
constitute a novel system of dividend regulation, noting how they (1)
combine, for arguably the first time, aspects of both the formalmandatory and informal-discretionary dimensions of bank regulation,
and (2) provide an example for how bank supervision has, in some
respects, already incorporated attributes of risk regulatory theory and
practice. Part VII concludes.
II. WHY DIVIDENDS MATTER IN A PRIVATIZED SYSTEM OF FINANCE
In a privatized system of finance, for-profit companies are
responsible for performing the key financial functions that together
are “the oil that lubricates the wheels of commerce.”15 These private
financial companies provide the payment systems infrastructure for
large and small transactions, transmit monetary policy, manage risk
through derivatives and insurance, provide information to markets,
facilitate international trade, and transform savings (e.g., deposits)
into investment capital (e.g., business loans). To fund these activities,
companies raise capital from investors. By relying on private
investment capital to fund these for-profit finance companies, such a
financial system subjects the companies to the pressures and demands
of capital markets.16 The investors that fund financial enterprises look,
15

BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST?: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 299 (1986).
16
A privatized system of finance is not a preordained state of affairs, even in a
largely capitalist system of economic exchange. On the other end of the spectrum are
state-administered banking regimes like that of China, where the state dictates lending
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as do all equity investors, for a return on their investment. Because the
business of banking is conducted overwhelmingly through the
corporate form,17 the relevant investors are stock investors, who obtain
policy through the use of macroprudential regulatory tools; as lending overheats, the
state authorities order Chinese banks to increase loss provisions and capital buffers,
and when companies struggle to obtain finance, state authorities order banks to lend
more.
See, e.g., China Tightening: End of the Binge, FIN. TIMES, http://
smartnews.cc/financial-times/BcFtCoAgDADQE-3LFrhuo-bwR1LgwOv33oj4LqK9N3
pgeye1uWjRQYlFzO8OdtYCIp0he07ALKreS1UrOGI-Pw#.VgebmOlOTww (last visited
Sept. 27, 2015) (reporting how China’s bank supervisor implemented Basel risk
weighting system in a manner so as to encourage debt capital flows to small and
medium businesses); Claire Jones, The Third Arm: Macroprudential Policy, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e498de-de03-11e0a391-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3mvERwsDb (contrasting historic tendency of Asian
governments to rely on macroprudential tools such as loan-to-value ratios to affect
credit flows in economy with tendency of non-Asian large economies to rely solely on
monetary and fiscal policy). Even the United States had a formal state-administered
home mortgage credit system in the form of the government-sponsored entities Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac before they were legally, though not economically, privatized.
See Roger Congleton, The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008, in LESSONS FROM
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 23, 23
(Robert W. Kolb, ed. 2010) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS] (noting that
Congress formed Fannie Mae in 1938 and arranged for its privatization in 1968); David
Reiss, Privatizing Profit and Socializing Loss, in LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS, supra, 437, 437
(writing in 2010 that “[t]he federal government has given [Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac] the mission of providing liquidity and stability to the United States residential
mortgage market and achieving certain affordable housing goals”).
17
Congress has also provided authority to government agencies to charter mutual,
non-corporate private credit institutions such as credit unions and mutual thrift banks
(also known as mutual savings and loans institutions). See Mehrsa Baradaran, How the
Poor Got Cut out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 50019 (2013). Total assets at U.S. credit
unions as of June 2014 were over one trillion dollars. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE
SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: FIRST QUARTER 2014 78 (2014),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20140605/z1.pdf [hereinafter
Q1 2014 FUNDS FLOW / BALANCE SHEETS]. While that amount is significant, it pales in
comparison to the nearly thirteen trillion dollars of assets held by non-credit union
depository institutions. See id. at 76. The thrift industry, while larger than the credit
union industry in terms of total assets, has experienced large-scale demutualization,
which refers to the process of conversion from a mutual ownership structure to a stock
ownership structure. See JAMES A. WILCOX, CREDIT UNION CONVERSIONS TO BANKS:
FACTS, INCENTIVES, ISSUES AND REFORMS 2 (2006) (“Between 1975 and 2004, there were
1,830 mutual-to-stock thrift conversions, and the number of mutual thrifts shrunk
from 3,791 to 625.”). So most of today’s thrifts are, like national banks, stock
companies. Furthermore, it is expected that most remaining thrifts (whether mutual
or stock companies) will convert to national banks in the coming years to avoid the
surviving restrictions on thrift activities in the post-Dodd-Frank Act regulatory
environment. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 89 (2010), available at http://
fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/DavisPolk-Summary-of-Dodd-FrankWall-Street-Reform-Act.pdf (“Although [the Dodd-Frank Act] maintains the federal
thrift charter, it eliminates the most important advantages of the thrift charter and
imposes new penalties for failure to comply with the qualified thrift lender (‘QTL’)
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returns on their capital investment in the form of stock dividends.18
The banking sector is distinctive because banks receive regulatory
licenses to offer government-insured deposited savings and also enjoy
access to special government safety nets unavailable to other financial
market participants. The banking license therefore makes the
government the primary risk-bearer in the event a bank defaults on its
debts. In exchange for the privileges of the license, banks must comply
with an extensive regulatory apparatus designed in principle to protect
the government’s contingent liability—i.e., its promise to provide
lender-of-last-resort facilities and its deposit guarantee. One way of
conceptualizing this regulatory apparatus is as a stand-in19 for the
contractual protections that private lenders and guarantors would
extract from the bank in a system without government safety nets, to
forestall attempts by managers and stockholders to obtain higher
returns by taking on levels of risk that are excessive from the vantage
point of creditors.20 It might be objected that creditors could do this
test. As a result, it is likely that most holders of a thrift charter will have a powerful
incentive to convert it into a bank charter.”). The FRB has reflected this expectation
in its quarterly funds flow report, in which it has collapsed thrifts with commercial
banks in an umbrella category labeled “U.S.-chartered depository institutions.” See Q1
2014 FUNDS FLOW / BALANCE SHEETS, supra, at iii.
18
Investors might object that stockholders also obtain returns in the form of
capital gains. See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L.J. 845, 846
(2005) (reporting that “[d]uring the two decades preceding [2003], corporate boards
steadily moved away from the dividends—the traditional vehicle for distributing profits
to shareholders—diverting about half of the cash they distribute to shareholders to
open-market repurchases of their firms’ own common stock” and ascribing that trend
in large part to preferential tax treatment of capital gains relative to dividends). While
that is true in practice, in theory the capital gain only reflects heightened expectations
of future dividends. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
80 (10th ed. 2011) (“[S]hare value is equal to the discounted stream of dividends per
share.”); ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION 323 (3d ed. 2012) (“In the
strictest sense, the only cash flow you receive when you buy shares in a publicly traded
[corporation] is a dividend.”); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 28889 (10th ed. 2007)
(“The only thing that makes shares valuable is the expectation of payments of
[dividends] at some time in the future.”).
19
But see Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 222–23
(1988) (“Our point is not that such regulatory devices do not exist; rather our
arguments are (1) that these measures impose fewer constraints on excessive risktaking than would be optimal from a societal perspective; and (2) that they do not
punish excessive risk-taking by individual banks in the same way as a market-driven
system would, because these measures are uniformly applied to all banks.”).
20
See HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK
REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S xv (1991); id. at 41 (“[B]ank regulators faced the
classic creditor’s dilemma of how to prevent unanticipated future alterations in the
risk posture of insured banks . . . . [In response, t]hey imposed a series of restrictive
covenants on the banking industry designed to limit the ability of bank managers to
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on their own, but the opacity of bank balance sheets is such that the
costs of obtaining private information about banks’ relative credit risk
is prohibitive. The regulatory apparatus, then, is justified on the
grounds of obviating the need to monitor the creditworthiness of
banks—of making bank debt (most obviously, insured deposits), in the
words of Professor Gary Gorton, “information-insensitive.”21
This point took on added salience during the period from the
1980s to the present because the charter values of banks—that is, the
ability to benefit from regulatory restrictions on competition and
entry—has declined as a result of competition from non-regulated
financial institutions.22 Historically, banking law and regulation
imposed various anti-competitive restrictions in the banking sector
that endowed banks with market power, making their charters
valuable.23 The charter value of a bank, then, refers to the capitalized
benefits of these restrictions that banks enjoy.24 In the 1980s,
technology and deregulation conspired to erode the charter value of

take actions that increased the risk of loss to the insurance fund.”). The regulatory
intervention is also motivated by a concern to promote a stable financial system by
counteracting externalities resulting from excessive financial risk taking—that is, risk
taking by financial institutions that creates negative effects on third parties, such as
users of finance, unable to protect themselves through bargaining.
21
See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 19–23
(2010); cf. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models,
Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 129–60 (R.
Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991) (arguing that one purpose of banks is that they create debt
(e.g., deposits) to serve as a medium of exchange, but that the opaqueness of the asset
side of bank balance sheets (i.e., their loan portfolios) gives rise to an information
asymmetry between debt holders and banks that requires intervention, either through
clearing houses or regulation).
22
See A. Sinan Cebenoyan et al., Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking
Behavior for Thrifts, 28 FIN. MGMT. 43, 43–44 (1999). Others emphasize that the largest
banks still enjoy significant bank charter value due to the implicit perceptions of
government support. See Global Financial Stability Report: Moving from Liquidity- to
Growth-Driven
Markets,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
104
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/index.htm (“In terms of the
funding cost advantage in 2013, these subsidies are at least 15 or so basis points in the
United States, 25–60 basis points in Japan, 20–60 basis points in the United Kingdom,
and 60–90 basis points in the euro area.”). But the evidence of this position in
equivocal, especially in the United States. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LARGE
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 40 (2014), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665162.pdf (“Our analysis and the results of
studies we reviewed provide evidence that the largest bank holding companies had
lower funding costs than smaller bank holding companies during the 20072009
financial crisis but that differences may have declined or reversed in more recent
years.”).
23
See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 1183, 1198 (1990).
24
Id. at 1185.
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banking firms.25 No longer could bank managers and investors sit back
and comfortably enjoy earnings subsidized by the governmentimposed barriers to entry.26 As a result, the potential loss of the charter
no longer stood as a bulwark against the moral hazard that would
otherwise exist due to the government’s guarantee of bank debt (i.e.,
deposit insurance).27 In this new market environment, banks no
longer enjoyed meaningful charter values. Consequently, the moral
hazard effect took root and banks took on additional leverage and
embraced riskier lending programs.28 The decline in charter value of
banks reinforced the normative justification for the bank supervisory
system: that is, to serve as a counterweight to this moral hazard effect,
which would otherwise result in risk-taking and leverage in excess of
socially optimal levels, both from the perspective of the deposit insurer
(the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and the lender of last
resort (the FRB).
Dividend restrictions have historically formed a part of this
supervisory system. The risk of insolvency for a bank is, as with any
firm, inversely related to its equity capitalization—that is, as the
amount of equity decreases, less equity is available to absorb future
losses and the risk of default on debt claims increases.29 By paying
dividends, a bank reduces its equity.30 Therefore, it is unsurprising that
bank regulators and policymakers have sought to restrict a bank’s
ability to declare and pay dividends.31 Dividend regulation protects
25

See id. (measuring charter value by looking to declining market-to-book value
ratios).
26
See id. at 1185–86.
27
See Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance Loan
Guarantees, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3, 7 (1977). Merton described this moral hazard effect
of deposit insurance as a put option on the bank’s assets. If the value of the assets
exceeds the value of the loans on the maturity date of the bank’s debt, then the
stockholders will exercise the option and pay back the debt. If, on the other hand, the
value of the assets does not exceed the value of the debt, then the stockholders will let
the option lapse and the deposit insurer will make good on the debt claims. Cf. Keeley,
supra note 23, at 1186.
28
See Keeley, supra note 23, at 1184.
29
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 447–58 (discussing costs of financial
distress).
30
See ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 60 (2012) (“A
corporation may distribute to shareholders dividends, which are cash payments from
equity.”).
31
In this Article, “bank supervision” and “bank regulation” are used
interchangeably. For an explanation of the difference between “regulation” and
“supervision” in the financial regulatory context, see Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential
Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues? 16–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 7926, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w7926.
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against insolvency, thereby also limiting recourse to government safety
nets by ensuring the bank maintains a buffer to absorb unexpected
losses. But it does more than that. By requiring banks to maintain
some equity capitalization at all times, it also ensures that
stockholders—and, indirectly, the directors they elect to the board—
have something to lose in the event of financial distress. Consequently,
it promotes a corporate governance system in which stockholders are
incentivized to guard against the possibility of failure. If the dividend
restrictions are meaningful, then the privatized system should police
itself relatively well: stockholders are in effect deputized to play an
important role in promoting financial stability and institution-level
safety and soundness. But notwithstanding the potential utility of
dividend restrictions as a regulatory tool, they had largely faded into
irrelevance prior to the recent reforms. Dividend restrictions became
obsolete because they relied too heavily on rigid accounting metrics to
police dynamic, flexible institutions, and they failed to consider how
dividends might affect a bank’s financial condition in light of future
contingencies.
III. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANK DIVIDEND RESTRICTIONS
Before explaining why traditional dividend restrictions became
obsolete and what is meant by the new contingency of bank dividends,
it is necessary to understand the history of dividend regulation. The
early history of these restrictions grows out of three landmark pieces
of banking legislation that together created modern U.S. banking law:
the National Bank Act of 1864, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and
the Banking Act of 1933. Whether these restrictions applied to a given
distribution of corporate bank funds depended entirely on a snapshot
determination of either a precise accounting metric or compliance
with a payments system obligation. For example, a dividend would be
illegal if it were paid out of “capital,” a legal accounting metric with
specialized meaning in banking law. Similarly, a dividend would be
illegal if it were paid when a bank failed to comply with laws concerning
the amounts of reserves it was required to maintain. Gradually,
Congress introduced the more indeterminate term “unsafe and
unsound practices” as a trigger for regulatory intervention that would
justify, among other things, restrictions of dividends.
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A. In Early U.S. Banking Legislation, Dividend Legality Depended on
Rigid Accounting Metrics and Compliance with Payments Obligations
Regulation of corporate dividends is not unique to banking law.
Since the late nineteenth century, legislatures and regulators have
limited the ability of all corporations, including banks, to declare
dividends. These restrictions, referred to as “legal capital” rules, most
typically specify that a corporation may only declare dividends out of
current earnings or earned surplus.32 The legislative impetus behind
these restrictions was to afford a modicum of extra-contractual
protection for creditors.33 In effect, the board could only declare a
dividend after the corporation had paid its creditors, or, alternatively,
when the corporation had accumulated earnings from previous
accounting periods that would be available for execution by creditors.
State legislatures included these dividend restrictions as part of general
corporation laws that facilitated the formation of limited liability
enterprises.34
Unsurprisingly, Congress included dividend restrictions in its first
general incorporation statute for federally chartered banks.35 The
32

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (West 2015) (authorizing boards of directors to
declare dividends only from retained earnings); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2015)
(permitting corporations to declare dividends out of “surplus” or, where there is no
surplus, out of net profits for the current and preceding year); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. §
510(b) (McKinney 2015) (same).
33
See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (Cir. Ct. D. Me. 1824) (“[T]he capital
stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of the debts
contracted by the bank.”); DONALD KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS: LEGAL AND
ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 15 (1941) (“[T]he
principal objective of dividend law has therefore been the preservation of a minimum
of assets as a safeguard in assuring the payment of creditors’ claims.”). In this respect,
the legal capital rules share a similar purpose with fraudulent transfer laws, which
permit certain creditors to avoid transactions that, among other things, transfer
property of a debtor when it is, or nearly is, insolvent. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
ACT §§ 4 & 5 (1984). Both legal devices restrict transfers of corporate property as the
solvency of the corporation becomes impaired.
34
With general incorporation statutes, state legislatures created the power for any
individual or group of individuals to form business corporations by complying with the
same set of generally applicable criteria. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634 (1988) (“General
business corporation acts, which permitted firms to incorporate without seeking a
special charter from the legislature, first became popular during the Jacksonian
period.”); see also Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A
Continuation of Willlard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 101–05 (1999)
(chronicling history of state general incorporation statutes, from the era of initial
experimentation in New York (1811), Pennsylvania (1836) and Connecticut (1837) to
the Reconstruction era, by which time forty-four of the forty-seven states had enacted
such statutes).
35
See National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 [hereinafter NBA] (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) created a new category of financial
institution, national banks, which would issue bank notes backed by
U.S. bonds deposited with the U.S. Treasury.36 In enacting the NBA,
Congress hoped to create a new and reliable national currency, in the
process promoting the market for federal bonds and facilitating the
financing of the Civil War.37 A new federal administrative agency, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), would administer
this new privatized and federalized banking system.38 The NBA applied
36

See id. § 16 (establishing as a condition of a national bank charter that applicant
deposit the greater of one-third of the applicant’s paid-in capital and $30,000 in the
form of U.S. government bonds).
37
See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 548 (1869) (“These powers [to provide
for a national currency], until recently, were only partially and occasionally exercised.
Lately, however, they have been called into full activity, and Congress has undertaken
to supply a currency for the entire country.”); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 7 (2003) (“Backed by
government securities, these circulating notes were designed to be the new national
currency that would hold a stable value and could be used, reliably, across the
nation.”). The creation of a reliable national currency was, however, the lesser of the
two goals; the immediate impetus behind the legislation was war finance. National
banks would be required to purchase federal bonds as a precondition to the grant of
a charter, contributing to demand for U.S. government securities. See THOMAS P. KANE,
THE ROMANCE AND TRAGEDY OF BANKING 5 (1922) (“[The NBA] was originally a war
measure, and it grew out of the urgent necessities of the Government to replenish the
public treasury by creating a market for its bonds through the inducement offered
banks to obtain circulation based upon the security of such bonds.”); Bray Hammond,
The North’s Empty Purse, 1861-1862, 67 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 1, 11 (1961) (listing as a
critical component of federal efforts to finance the Civil War “the authorization of a
system of national banks, whose purchases of bonds to guarantee their issues of
circulating notes would create a new supply of funds for the government”); cf. RANAJOY
RAY CHAUDHURI, THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN BANKING: DEREGULATION,
REREGULATION, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 2 (2014) (“The aims [of the NBA]
were to create a national currency, damage the interests of the banking sector in the
Confederate South (where a majority of the state banks were located), and, along with
income taxes and excise duties, help finance the American Civil War for the Union.”).
Although the national bank system traces its roots to war finance, it was only part of a
broader array of in extremis maneuverings by the Treasury Department—such as new
taxes and the printing of legal tender fiat currency—and ultimately proved “of far less
help to the war than the war was of help to it.” Hammond, supra, at 10; see also RICHARD
H. TIMBERLAKE, THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 85–86 (1978).
Nevertheless, the enduring legacy of the legislation was the creation a new nationwide
financial infrastructure buttressed by uniform currency issued by regulated banks. See
A. Piatt Andrew, The Crux of the Currency Question, 2 YALE L.J. 595, 609 (1913) (quoting
Alphonso Taft, who served as the U.S. Attorney General in Ulysses Grant’s
administration, as having stated: “if the Civil War resulted in nothing else than
providing the country with a uniform currency it would not have been fought in vain”).
38
Technically, Congress had created the OCC a year earlier, in 1863, when it
enacted the National Currency Act. See 1 ALFRED M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKING LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES § 2.05 (2d ed. 1999). The NBA was seen as a corrective measure,
and it supplanted the 1863 Act. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 731 (1957).
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basic legal capital rules to the national banks, prohibiting them from
effectuating distributions of corporate property, including dividends,
out of their “capital,” a term that included the initial and any
subsequent equity contributions by stockholders.39 As a result of this
restriction, a bank could only pay dividends out of its retained
earnings—that is, current earnings or past earnings kept within the
firm and not distributed or re-invested in the bank.40
In recognition of the special vulnerabilities of banks, Congress
restricted dividends in additional ways that went beyond the traditional
legal capital rules. For example, the NBA required each national bank
to contribute ten percent of its previous year’s earnings to a “surplus”
fund until such fund amounted to twenty percent of its total capital
stock before declaring any dividends at all.41 For state banks that
converted into the new national bank form, limited liability was
conditioned on the maintenance of the twenty percent surplus; failure
to maintain it would trigger a prohibition on declaring dividends until
the bank replenished the surplus.42 Stockholders receiving dividends
in violation of these restrictions would be liable to the bank or its
receiver unless they had a good faith belief that it was properly paid.43
The NBA also imposed reserve requirements on national banks,
mandating that banks maintain minimum amounts of reliable assets
“on hand” (or on deposit with money-center banks in cities such as
New York44)—referred to in banking law as “lawful money”45—to honor
39

NBA, supra note 35, § 38 (prohibition on withdrawal of capital); id. §§ 7–16
(discussing initial capitalization requirements for banks and requirements relating to
increasing or decreasing, and depositing bonds in respect of, bank “capital”).
40
See W. STEVE ALBRECHT ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS 28 (11th ed. 2011).
41
NBA, supra note 35, § 33.
42
Id. § 12.
43
See Finn v. Brown, 142 U.S. 56, 70 (1891) (“In regard to the dividend . . . it was
clearly fraudulent and unlawful . . . . The money belonged to the bank, and ought to
have been restored to the bank [by the director defendant].”); McDonald v. Williams,
174 U.S. 397, 398–99, 408 (1899) (holding receiver of a national bank could not obtain
recovery of illegal dividend paid entirely out of the bank’s capital because “the
stockholder receiving such dividend acted in good faith, believing the same to be paid
out of profits”).
44
See NBA, supra note 35, § 32 (permitting a bank to “keep one half of its lawful
money reserve in cash deposits in the city of New York”).
45
As used in the NBA, “lawful money” referred to legal tender United States notes,
known as “greenbacks,” which had been issued in 1862 and 1863. Edward C. Simmons,
The Concept of Lawful Money, 46 J. POL. ECON. 108, 111 (1938). Congress periodically
adjusted the “lawful money” classification in the decades following the NBA to include
specie, U.S. notes, Federal Reserve notes, clearinghouse certificates, and silver and
gold certificates. See Ira Cross, Lawful Money: A Note, 46 J. POL. ECON. 409, 410–11
(1938). Congress possesses this power under the Constitution, and since 1913 has
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the bank notes it issued in the ordinary course.46 Congress anticipated
how dividends might pose a threat to reserves; it expressly prohibited
any bank whose reserves had fallen below statutory thresholds from
paying dividends to its stockholders.47
These dividend restrictions formed part of the regulatory
infrastructure for this newly established, post-NBA nationwide
financial system.48 Together with minimum initial capitalization
levels,49 restrictions on the assets banks could hold and liabilities they
could issue,50 deposit of government bonds as security for national
banks notes,51 and provisions limiting bank activities to the “business of
banking,”52 these federal interventions into what would otherwise be
among the core—arguably the core—prerogatives of bank
management53 promoted adequate capitalization levels at national
delegated it to the FRB. See Milam v. United States, 524 U.S. 629, 630 (9th Cir. 1974)
(discussing Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)). Interestingly, national bank
notes themselves were not lawful money—even following the enactment of the NBA.
See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 60 Ind. 193, 194 (1877) (reversing conviction of defendant
for larceny of “lawful money of the United States” because defendant might have
stolen national bank notes, which “are in no sense money of the United States”).
46
See NBA, supra note 35, § 31 (imposing fifteen percent reserve requirement on
national banks that increased to twenty-five percent for banks located in statutorily
designated money center cities); J. LAWRENCE BROZ, THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 27–28 (1997). A bank regulatory regime that requires
banks to maintain minimum amounts of reliable assets as a percentage of total deposit
liabilities is referred to as a fractional reserve banking system. See N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 332–33 (2012) (introducing principles of fractional
reserve banking).
47
See NBA, supra note 35, § 41 (prohibiting banks from “mak[ing] any dividend
of its profits until the required proportion between the aggregate amount of its
outstanding notes of circulation and deposits and its lawful money of the United States
shall be restored”).
48
See POLLARD ET AL., supra note 38, § 2.05 (“The National Bank Act of 1864
provided the foundation for the modern system of federal bank regulation.”).
49
See NBA, supra note 35, § 7 (setting forth minimum initial amounts of paid-in
capital for national banks ranging from $50,000 to $200,000, depending on the size of
the city in which the bank would be “organized”).
50
See id. § 28 (setting forth limitations on national banks’ real estate holdings); 1
MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ¶ 1.02
(2012) (“The act imposed . . . restrictions on lending policies.”).
51
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
52
See NBA, supra note 35, § 8 (restricting national banks only to the conduct of
the “business of banking,” to be defined by the OCC, and providing an exhaustive list
of legal bank powers).
53
Subject to fiduciary duties and legal capital rules (and special legislativeregulatory rules for particular industries, such as the banking restrictions discussed
above), the payment of dividends under U.S. corporate law has always been the
exclusive province of the board of directors. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (applying the business judgment rule to board of directors’
decision to declare dividends).
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banks and reduced perceptions of their credit risk. In the process, they
also bolstered confidence in the new national banking system.
Dividend restrictions, as we have seen, served as backstops for several
of these measures.
Increased confidence in national banks was crucial to the
postbellum financial system, and it differed sharply from the
uncertainty and instability that marked the previous era of banking in
the United States. With the NBA, Congress had created, in effect, a
new national currency, issued by national banks and backed by the U.S.
Treasury Department.54 Over the next few decades, this new currency
gradually replaced the thousands of different state bank notes that
previously had comprised the money supply during the period
between the demise of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836
and the enactment of the NBA, known as the “free banking” era.55
These state bank notes were often of dubious quality, and merchants
had no centralized information source to rely on in determining
whether the notes were issued by financially solid banks or poorly
capitalized, or even insolvent, banks.56 Now that there was a
standardized federal currency issued by reliable banks, businesses no

54

See supra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text.
See CHAUDHURI, supra note 37, at 7–19; GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING
FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING 11–17 (2012); SCHROEDER, supra
note 50, ¶ 1.02. The national bank era was also, in a sense, a “free banking” era,
inasmuch as there was no central governmental authority allocating credit and all
applicants could form a bank by complying with the statute. See HAMMOND, supra note
38, at 727 (“The new act was a free-banking measure, derived from the original freebanking law enacted in New York in 1838 but modified by variations thereof in other
states.”). In fact, on the surface all the NBA did was create another chartering entity
(the OCC), if anything increasing the freedom of choice for would-be bank founders.
In context, however, the coercive effect of Congressional intervention becomes
apparent. Congress did not merely create a new chartering option; it also imposed a
ten percent federal tax in 1866 on state-chartered bank notes. This tax pressured state
banks to convert to the national bank form, which thereafter became the predominant
form through which the business of banking was conducted. See id. at 733–34; Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 548–49 (1869) (acknowledging that the tax’s purpose
might very well have been the destruction of the state banking system, but nevertheless
upholding its constitutionality); but cf. HAMMOND, supra note 38, at 734 (noting that
the tax did not completely eliminate the state bank form, since money increasingly
took the form of bank deposits, which were untaxed).
56
See GORTON, supra note 55, at 19; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY:
A SHORT HISTORY 1 (2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/about/what-wedo/history/OCC%20history%20final.pdf (“[T]he biggest problem with state banking
before the Civil War was that it discouraged the development of an integrated national
market and a shared national identity. At each destination, long-distance travelers had
to convert their bank notes into local money, usually sustaining a loss with each
exchange. The cost and inconvenience were significant deterrents to interstate travel
and commerce.”).
55
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longer needed to hold a hodgepodge of disparate, potentially
worthless notes, nor accept the risk that their counterparties would
discount their notes. Once national bank notes had become the norm,
all that mattered was whether that business had enough of them to
consummate a transaction.
With the confidence in this new standardized, federal national
bank note currency firmly established, bank liabilities increasingly took
the form of deposits of currency, and checks, which represented a draw
on those deposit accounts, became the predominant form of money
by the close of the century.57 But this new deposit-check financial
system revealed itself to be even less stable than the state bank note
system that had prevailed during the free banking era.58 Whereas the
chief problem with the free banking era was the uncertain credit
quality of state bank notes, the problem in the post-NBA national
banking era was that merchants did not know how much specie and
currency, however standardized, the banks actually held to support
their deposits.59 This uncertainty led to runs.60
The eventual solution was the creation of a central bank in 1914
to act as lender of last resort to shore up depositor confidence.61 The
57

See Kris James Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, The Evolution of Bank Supervision:
Evidence from U.S. States 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20603,
2014), available at http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/MITCHENER%20%20Bank%20Supervision.pdf (“By the end of 1900, bank notes made up less than 10%
of all liabilities.”).
58
See GORTON, supra note 55, at 20–24 (observing that banking panics between the
Civil War and establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 “all involved
demand deposits, as currency was now backed by the federal government and was no
longer subject to runs”); ELMUS WICKER, BANKING PANICS OF THE GILDED AGE xii (2000)
(“[T]he identifying characteristic of all major banking panics [during the period from
the Civil War to 1907] was the general loss of depositor confidence manifest by a
sudden and unanticipated switch from deposits to currency.”); Calomiris & Gorton,
supra note 21, at 129–60; O.M.W. SPRAGUE, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL
BANKING SYSTEM (1910) (report commissioned by the National Monetary Commission,
which Congress formed in Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908 in reaction to the Panic of
1907, individuating banking “crises” in 1873, 1893, and 1907, a “panic” in 1884, and
“financial stringency” in 1890).
59
But cf. supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text (noting that the fractional
reserve system of the NBA required banks to maintain “lawful money” at a certain
percentage of their total deposit and note liabilities—an amount that in any event was
far short of their total deposit liabilities).
60
See supra note 58 (citing Sprague report, a study of post-NBA banking crises).
61
See BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 8–9 (2014).
In the period leading up to the creation of the Federal Reserve System, money center
banks set up clearinghouses that served as private lenders of last resort, performing
functions that were typically the province of central banks. See id.; GORTON, supra note
55, at 51 (“Before the Federal Reserve came about in the United States, banks tried to
reduce the possibility of anyone finding secrets by creating stronger backing of
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Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve System
(FRS),62 a decentralized central bank system consisting of twelve
“federal reserve banks.” It would serve as the first central bank for the
United States since Andrew Jackson won his battle not to renew the
charter of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836.63 A Board of
Governors would oversee the FRS. The Federal Reserve Act picks up
where the NBA left off, making adjustments to existing reserve
requirements and applying dividend restrictions to a wider array of
banks.
Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act applied the prohibition on
dividends paid out of capital, previously applicable only to national
banks,64 to state banks that became members of the FRS.65 The Act also
imposed the first dividend reporting requirement on U.S. banks,
requiring member banks to file reports with the Comptroller of the
Currency detailing payments of dividends to stockholders.66
Furthermore, it established new reserve requirements for all member
banks, which included not only state member banks but also all
national banks.67 The Act required each member bank to maintain its
reserves with the Federal Reserve Bank of which it was a member or
with another federal reserve bank at which it maintained an account.68
Banks could draw on these reserves to meet existing liabilities, but they
could not pay any dividends “unless and until the total reserve required
by law is fully restored.”69 Again, the idea motivating the dividend
restrictions was to ensure each bank maintained a minimum amount

demand deposits. The principal way they did this was by organizing themselves into
clearinghouses.”); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007
33–37 (2010) (discussing role of clearinghouses during the national bank era);
WICKER, supra note 58, at 1215 (describing how the New York Clearing House
(NYCH) issued certificates backed by the NYCH, which had the power to pool all
member reserves, and how the persistence of banking crises notwithstanding the
NYCH was due to its institutional failure to take collective action rather than any
structural weakness of the clearinghouse concept).
62
Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (creating federal reserve banks owned by
privately controlled “member banks” that became members of the FRS).
63
See HAMMOND, supra note 38, at 439.
64
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
65
Federal Reserve Act, supra note 62, § 9.
66
Id.
67
Id. §§ 2, 19. The Act required all national banks to become members of the
FRS.
68
Id. § 19. The Federal Reserve Act reserve requirements differed from the NBA
reserve requirements, which had previously required national banks to maintain
reserves in the form of “lawful money on hand.”
69
Id.; cf. supra notes 4547 and accompanying text.
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of liquid funds that deposit creditors could withdraw, thereby
promoting confidence in the banking system and limiting bank runs.
The next landmark banking law legislation in the United States
was the Banking Act of 1933, which established the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).70 The Act created a new dividend
restriction in the interests of another privileged creditor: the FDIC
itself.71 The FDIC, the first federal deposit insurer, was (and still is
today) funded by assessments from insured depository institutions.72
The Act proscribed the payment of any dividends while any assessment
obligations remained outstanding.73 It also required all insured banks
to become members of the FRS, which in the process subjected all
insured banks, including those state banks that were previously not
members of the FRS, to the basic suite of federal bank dividend
restrictions.74 In 1959, Congress created a new dividend contingency
in the form of a procedural requirement that national banks must seek
prior approval of the Comptroller of the Currency before declaring
dividends under certain circumstances. Specifically, the prior approval
requirement applied where the bank proposed to declare dividends in
a calendar year in an amount in excess of the aggregate retained net
profits of the previous three years.75
70

Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 15, 39 U.S.C.).
71
The Act also included the Glass-Steagall Act, which restricted securities and
insurance activities of commercial banks, as well as affiliations between commercial
banks and companies conducting those activities. See PATRICIA L. MCCOY, BANKING LAW
MANUAL §§ 7.01, 7.02[1], 7.03[1] & [3], and 7.04 (2d ed., 2015).
72
See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (2014) (setting forth insurance assessment
regime).
73
Banking Act of 1933, supra note 70, § 8 (adding a new section 12A to the Federal
Reserve Act). Section 8 imposed criminal liability on directors and officers that
“participat[e] in the declaration or payment” of such dividends. Id.
74
Id. (adding new Section 12B(l)); see supra notes 39 & 65 and accompanying text
(detailing how the Federal Reserve Act applied the NBA’s basic no-dividends-fromcapital restriction, previously applicable only to national banks, to all member banks
of the FRS).
75
See Act to Amend the National Banking Laws to Clarify or Eliminate
Ambiguities, to Repeal Certain Laws Which Have Become Obsolete, and for Other
Purposes, § 21(a), Pub. L. 86-230, 73 Stat. 465 (1959) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 60(b)
(2012)); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL: CAPITAL AND DIVIDENDS 16 (2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/capital3.pdf (“A bank that
declares a dividend in excess of its current year net income may attribute dividends in
excess of the current year’s net income to each of the prior two years, to the extent
that there is sufficient undistributed net income in those years.”); MICHAEL P. MALLOY,
THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS: REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 248–49 (1988) (referring to this restriction as a “net
profits or modified earned surplus test”). By virtue of Section 9 of the Federal Reserve
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B. Introducing Indeterminacy into Banking Law Through the Term
“Unsafe and Unsound Practices”: Applications to Dividend
Restrictions
The restrictions discussed so far leave little room for
administrative discretion and rely on regulatory accounting methods
to yield binary regulatory decisions: either the dividend is legal, in
which case regulators have no role, or it is illegal, in which case
regulators will proscribe it, order its restitution, or withdraw
government licenses to the charter or deposit insurance. With the
Banking Act of 1933, Congress introduced a more indeterminate
term—”unsafe and unsound practices”—into the U.S. banking law
lexicon. Subsequent legislative actions empowered bank supervisors
to take certain actions, including ad hoc dividend restrictions, if they
found banks (or their executives or directors) engaging in such
practices.
Section 30 of the Banking Act vested the FRB with authority to
issue show-cause orders on a bank’s directors and officers engaging in
unsafe or unsound practices in the conduct of the bank’s business.
Such an order would require them to demonstrate why they should not
be removed.76 In 1950, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act authorized
the FDIC to withdraw deposit insurance where the insured bank has
engaged or is engaged in unsafe or unsound practices.77 In 1966,
Congress amplified regulators’ powers by authorizing them to issue
cease-and-desist orders to banks engaging in unsafe or unsound
practices.78 In each of these cases, Congress intentionally left the term
ambiguous.79 The Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
John Horne, provided the following oft-cited gloss on the term during
testimony before Congress in 1966, over three decades after its
insertion into the U.S. banking laws:
Act, this requirement applied to all state member banks as well. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text. In 1994, Congress amended the statute to refer to “net income”
rather than “net profits,” but the requirement of prior OCC approval in such
circumstances persists today. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, § 602(h)(2), Pub. L. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 56). A national bank seeking approval for such a dividend
must submit its request to its district office. 12 C.F.R. § 5.64(b)(3) (2014).
76
Banking Act of 1933, supra note 70, § 30 (also providing authority to issue showcause orders to directors and officers of banks committing violations of law).
77
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 § 8(a), Pub. L. 81-97, 64 Stat. 873 (1950)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818).
78
Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 §§ 101, 102, 202, Pub. L. No. 89695, 80 Stat. 1028, 1028, 1036, 1046 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d), 1730,
1818).
79
See Joseph M. Korff, Banking, 8 B.C. L. REV. 599, 606 (1967).
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The concept of “unsafe or unsound practices” is one of
general application which touches upon the entire field of
the operations of a financial institution. For this reason, it
would be virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a
single all-inclusive or rigid definition the broad spectrum of
activities which are embraced by the term . . . . Like many
other generic terms widely used in the law, such as “fraud,”
“negligence,” “probable cause,” or “good faith,” the term
“unsafe or unsound practices” has a central meaning which
can and must be applied to constantly changing factual
circumstances. Generally speaking, an “unsafe or unsound
practice” embraces any action or lack of action, which is
contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued,
would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution,
its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance
funds.80
Courts have largely ratified Horne’s gloss on the indeterminate
statutory norm.81
In this post-New Deal banking regulatory
environment, the determination of safety or soundness required a
highly discretionary judgment with reference to the specific facts of the
case.82 Excessive or otherwise improper dividend payments are among
the types of conduct that bank regulators, and courts called on to
perform judicial review, have found to be “unsafe and unsound
practices.”83
80

Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and
S. 3695 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 49–50 (1966)
[hereinafter Horne Testimony] (memorandum submitted by John Horne, Chairman,
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.). Horne’s discussion entered the realm of formal public
law when the banking agencies included it in their examination manuals.
81
See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Greene Cnty. Bank v.
FDIC, 92 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1996); Nw. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 917 F.2d 1111
(8th Cir. 1990); Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d
259 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d
1127, 1145–46 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that a bank is in an “unsafe and unsound
condition” when it “is operated in such a manner as to cause unacceptable levels of
risk to its depositors’ funds”).
82
See Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP.
210, 211 (1993) (contrasting the wide discretion bank regulators exercise when
making “safety and soundness” determinations with the more “prophylactic” mode of
regulation that imposed direct controls on the conduct of the business of banking,
including dividend restrictions).
83
See Seidman v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 37 F.3d 911, 927 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“Among the specific acts that may constitute an unsafe and unsound practice are
paying excessive dividends, disregarding a borrower’s ability to repay, careless control
of expenses, excessive advertising, and inadequate liquidity.”) (quotation marks
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While Congress layered on new dividend restrictions with each
periodic post-crisis burst of banking law reform, state legislatures did
the opposite, attenuating the dividend restrictions embedded in the
legal capital rules.84 Legal capital restrictions in general corporation
statutes—that is, those laws governing non-bank, general purpose
business corporations—became anachronisms on account of changes
in the corporate law permitting zero-par value stock issuances.85 Where
the “capital” base could be manipulated by legal fiat, it no longer
remained a meaningful restriction to limit the payment of dividends
from a corporation’s capital.
But, as we have seen, restrictions on the ability of bank
stockholders to receive distributions of corporate property continued.
The source-of-strength doctrine was first articulated by the FRB in the
1980s pursuant to its authority under the 1956 Bank Holding Company
Act and eventually received a Congressional imprimatur in 2010. The
doctrine requires bank holding companies, the direct and indirect
equity owners of banks, to contribute additional funding to bank
subsidiaries that run into financial difficulty.86 So in the zone of
omitted); First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674,
680 (5th Cir. 1983); Thomas K. Benshop, 1992 OFIA LEXIS 14, *42 (1992)
(prohibiting former bank director from further participation in conduct of business
of any federally insured depository institution under Section 8(e) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act due in part to a finding that bank had “engaged in unsafe and
unsound practices in 1988 and 1989 by paying dividends which were excessive in light
of the bank’s condition”); *** Bank, 1986 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 2, *15 (1986)
(administrative appeals board affirming FDIC order requiring bank to “cease and
desist from unsafe and unsound banking practices,” including “[p]aying excessive cash
dividends in relation to the [b]ank’s net income”).
84
See supra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text (discussing concept of “legal
capital”).
85
See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 144–46 (2d ed. 1968). By permitting zero-par value (or de minimis
par value) stock issuances, the requirement that dividends be paid out of surplus no
longer represented a meaningful constraint on the board of directors. The issuance
of zero-par stock ensures that any positive equity capitalization will be surplus, which
is defined in most statutes as total paid-in capital minus aggregate par value, because
the aggregate par value would be zero—or, in the case of stock issued with de mininis
par value, negligible.
86
The legality of the source-of-strength doctrine was contested prior to its
adoption by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 616, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1 (2011) (providing express statutory authority for the
source-of-strength doctrine); Policy Statement of Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 52 Fed. Reg. 15707, 15708 (1987) (providing that the FRB would consider the
“failure” to “stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds
to its subsidiary” an unsafe and unsound banking practice, which would trigger, among
other things, the FRB’s authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to holding company);
MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th
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insolvency, bank stockholders might be required to make
contributions to, rather than permitted to receive distributions from,
banks.87
IV. “PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION”: RIGID AND MANDATORY
INTERVENTION POINTS BASED ON ACCOUNTING-BASED CAPITAL LEVELS
The next major banking law reform ushered in a new era of bank
capital adequacy regulation that would provide for, among many other
things, restrictions on dividends that were to apply before the in
extremis scenarios, such as capital impairment and reserve shortages,
described earlier. When it was enacted in 1991, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) represented the
most significant banking law reform since at least the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, and perhaps since the Banking Act of 1933 that
established the FDIC.88 Unsurprisingly for such an important reform,
FDICIA, like the major banking law reforms before it, also provided
for regulatory dividend restrictions. The “prompt corrective action”
(PCA) regime inserted a new Section 38 into the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act,89 which represented Congress’s attempt to force bank
regulators’ hands in the aftermath of the savings and loan debacle.90
Following that crisis, bank and thrift supervisors were excoriated for
having engaged in regulatory forbearance, refusing to take decisive
action until bank capital fell too low to be remediated through
effective supervision and enforcement.91 The problem was not an
Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that “the [FRB]’s
determination that [a] holding company’s failure to transfer its assets to a troubled
subsidiary was an ‘unsafe or unsound practice’ under § 1818(b)(1) is an unreasonable
and impermissible interpretation of that term”).
87
Cf. 12 U.S.C. §§ 55 & 324 (2012) (requiring bank regulators to levy assessments
on stockholders of national banks and state member banks of the FRS where their
“capital stock”—that is, their legal capital—is impaired).
88
See KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
EFFECTS 85 (5th ed. 2000) (“[P]rompt corrective actions standards have become the
primary regulatory influence over bank capital levels.”).
89
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, § 38, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat.
873 (1950) (codified at 12 U.S.C § 1831o). The FDIA established a comprehensive
system of regulation of federal deposit insurance, providing for, among other things,
an extensive supervisory architecture for insured banks and thrifts.
90
See SPONG, supra note 88, at 85 (“This system of supervision, commonly known
as prompt corrective action, represents an attempt to provide a timely and
nondiscretionary triggering mechanism for supervisory actions.”).
91
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS &
LOAN CRISIS: A CBO REPORT 9 (1992), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/102nd-congress-1991-1992/reports/1992_01_theeconeffectsofthes
avings.pdf (“Many analysts believe that this regulatory forbearance was an especially
key cause of the escalating public liabilities in the S&L crisis.”); LAWRENCE J. WHITE,
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authority deficit for supervisors—we have already seen how Congress
empowered them to withdraw deposit insurance and to issue ceaseand-desist orders. The problem instead was that supervisors failed to
exercise their discretion in deploying those sanctions.92
Under the PCA regime, Congress specified statutorily a five-part
classificatory system for capital adequacy—”well capitalized,”
“adequately
capitalized,”
“undercapitalized,”
“significantly
undercapitalized,” and “critically undercapitalized”—and instructed
the bank supervisors to set the numerical criteria for those categories.93
As a bank’s capital declines, its federal supervisor is empowered, and
eventually required, to intervene to address the source of the declining
capital levels.94 The regime functions as a capital “tripwire system” in
which institutions are subject to increasingly stringent supervision and
business restrictions as their health declines.95
For example, PCA requires an “undercapitalized” bank to submit
a “capital restoration plan” to its supervisor for approval.96 If the bank’s
capital dips to “significantly undercapitalized” levels, the supervisor is
required to take at least one of a series of actions, including requiring
that the bank raise additional capital, agree to an acquisition by a
better-capitalized institution, make certain asset divestitures, or cease
payments of dividends.97
Once a bank becomes “critically
undercapitalized,” PCA requires the supervisor to place it in
THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991).
92
Richard J. Herring, Banking Disasters: Causes and Preventative Measures: Lessons
Derived from the U.S. Experience, in PREVENTING BANK CRISES: LESSONS FROM RECENT
GLOBAL BANK FAILURES 209, 221–23 (Gerard Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 1998) (noting that
supervisors for savings and loan associations reduced capital requirements and allowed
for more liberal accounting rules to delay regulatory intervention for financial,
ideological and psychological reasons).
93
12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1). The statute directs the supervisors to define the metes
and bounds of the classifications, subject to statutory limits specified by the Congress.
See § 1831o(c).
94
§ 1831o(a)(2). Under the PCA regime, bank supervisors are empowered or
required, depending on the capitalization level of the supervised bank, to mandate the
submission of a “capital restoration plan,” “closely monitor” the bank, restrict asset
growth, require approval for certain transactions and business development plans
(e.g., new branching initiatives), restrict certain inter-affiliate transactions, restrict
interest rates paid on deposits, require divestiture of assets, prohibit deposits from
certain correspondent banks, restrict capital distributions, restrict payments on
subordinated debt, restrict payments to senior executives, and place the bank in
conservatorship or receivership. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)–(i).
95
Baxter, supra note 82, at 212.
96
§ 1831o(e)(2)(A).
97
§ 1831o(f)(2). In deciding which actions to take, the supervisor must apply
certain presumptions in favor of certain of the actions listed in subsection (f)(2)(H).
§ 1831o(f)(3).
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conservatorship or receivership.98
PCA expanded greatly the range of conditions over which bank
regulators could exert control over matters that were traditionally the
managerial prerogatives of bank management, including dividend
policy. By contrast, in the pre-PCA environment, intervention could
occur only where bank boards of directors declared a dividend while
the bank was experiencing in extremis financial circumstances: e.g.,
when the bank depleted its capital surplus, lacked profits out of which
it could pay dividends, accumulated arrearages on its FDIC
assessments, or failed to maintain adequate reserves with its federal
reserve bank.99 With PCA, regulatory intervention is supposed to occur
as soon as a bank is only “adequately capitalized.” Because a bank pays
dividends out of its capital, the PCA regime, which intervenes based on
capitalization levels, indirectly regulates outflows of dividends from
banks to their stockholders. That is, a bank might decide not to pay a
dividend to stockholders when doing so would place the bank in a new,
lower PCA capital category. It also directly regulates outflows of
dividends by authorizing supervisors to restrict distributions of bank
property to stockholders that would result in the bank becoming
“undercapitalized.”100 As discussed in Part V of this Article, PCA
expanded the scope of dividend restrictions somewhat, but stopped
well short of the conjectural, counterfactual, stress-based dividend
regulatory regime that Congress and the FRB introduced in 2011.

98

§ 1831o(h)(3)(A).
As noted earlier in Part III, supervisors have been statutorily empowered since
1966 to enjoin dividends even in the absence of a mandatory accounting-based or
compliance-based trigger. See supra note 78 (describing Congressional authorization
of supervisory agencies to issue cease and desist orders on any bank engaging in unsafe
or unsound practices). That said, the 1966 authority has lied largely dormant in the
ex ante sense, and is only invoked in an ex post enforcement capacity to enjoin a bank
from further wrongdoing or to implement a control regime to prevent a repeat of the
same. The legislative purpose behind FDICIA, by contrast, was to mandate supervisory
corrective action.
100
See § 1831o(d)(1)(A) (“An insured depository institution shall make no capital
distribution if, after making the distribution, the institution would be
undercapitalized.”).
99
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V. TWO WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT BANK DIVIDEND REGULATION
Since the Banking Act of 1933 introduced safety and soundness
concerns into regulatory practice,101 bank supervision in the United
States has occurred along two dimensions: a formal-mandatory dimension
and an informal-discretionary dimension. By looking at the history of
dividend restrictions through this binary lens, the important and novel
impact of the new stress testing initiative on dividend regulation stands
more starkly in relief. In particular, the new contingency of bank
dividends results from the way in which bank regulators have merged
these two dimensions for the first time in the CCAR program. Before
describing the new program, the following description outlines the
characteristics of this bipartite frame of reference. The formalmandatory dimension is characterized by rigid, formulaic, bright-line
rules. It vests little discretion in regulators and prefers to trigger
regulatory interventions based on actual, present circumstances. By
contrast, the informal-discretionary dimension vests considerable
flexibility in regulators, allowing them to intervene based on
qualitative, discretionary judgments—even including consideration of
hypothetical, conjectural scenarios. When operating in the formalmandatory dimension, supervisors are usually performing the
enforcement function of administrative law. When operating in the
informal-discretionary dimension, supervisors are undertaking a more
fulsome regulatory project102 involving risk identification and
assessment, decisions as to resource allocation, and discretionary
standard-setting.103
Figure 1 below maps the dividend restrictions discussed in the
previous Part IV along an x-axis reflecting the rigidity of the regulatory
program and a y-axis reflecting the extent to which the regulatory
program contemplates the use of regulatory discretion to consider
hypothetical, future scenarios.

101

See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing introduction of “unsafe
and unsound practices” term in the banking law lexicon).
102
See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)
(“Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process . . . .”).
103
See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure
in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 305 (1992) (describing the “four
phases” of regulatory action as hazard identification, allocation of resources, standard
setting, and standard enforcement).
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Figure 1: Regulatory Map of U.S. Bank Dividend Regulations
According to Their Rigidity and Use of Regulatory Discretion

Most of the action is in the lower left quadrant, which spatializes
the familiar formal-mandatory dimension of bank dividend regulation.
The informal-discretionary dimension is represented by the upper
right quadrant. Regulators have been empowered to regulate
dividends in this quadrant since 1933, when they acquired the power
to monitor “unsafe and unsound practices” of regulated banks and
their directors and officers.104 Nevertheless, regulatory activity—as
distinguished from regulatory authority—has been sparse in this
quadrant. The empty bottom right quadrant reflects an implicit
assumption that where actual, present circumstances justify regulatory
intervention, the rigid tools populating the lower left quadrant will
104

See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text (chronicling how bank supervisors
were successively empowered to take certain actions predicated on a finding of an
“unsafe or unsound practice,” including issuing show-cause orders on bank executives
in 1933, withdrawing deposit insurance in 1950, and issuing cease-and-desist orders in
1966).
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best promote regulatory objectives. The blank upper left quadrant is
where the CCAR program, to be discussed in Part VI, unites elements
of the informal-discretionary quadrant and the formal-mandatory
quadrant in a new system of bank dividend regulation. This new system
is both rigid and hypothetical. It allows regulators to consider the
effects of future scenarios on a bank, but also tethers those scenarios
to a system of rigid numerical trigger points that require intervention
by regulators. This latter point is important because it is a potential
antidote to regulators’ historical tendency towards inaction based on
what they perceive to be future, conjectural risks of loss.
A. The Formal-Mandatory Dimension of Bank Supervision
The formal-mandatory dimension has historically been the
province of Congress and consists of bright-line legal rules that require
precise applications, often carrying with them coercive sanctions.
Prominent examples of the formal-mandatory dimension include
prophylactic measures such as asset restrictions and the Glass-Steagall
Act’s prohibition on affiliations of commercial banks with securities
firms and insurance companies.105 As far as dividends are concerned,
we see this dimension in the prohibitions on declaring dividends when
a bank is not in compliance with its reserve requirements,106 when a
bank is in arrears with respect to its FDIC assessments,107 and when a
dividend would cut into a bank’s “capital surplus”108 or would be paid
in an amount in excess of three-year accumulated profits.109 With PCA,
Congress cemented the formal-mandatory dimension with a series of
prescriptive, formulaic statutory rules: a system of mandatory
intervention points calibrated to bank capitalization levels.110 The law
restricts the authority of a bank’s board of directors to declare
dividends based on precise calculations of the bank’s capitalization
level.111 There is little room for administrative discretion in PCA and
these other formal-mandatory regulatory tools.
Because the regulatory responses contemplated by the formalmandatory dimension are automatic, they rely on precisely calculated
triggering events. These triggering events are calibrated to payments
systems (e.g., whether the bank has transferred funds to satisfy its
105

See MCCOY, supra note 71, § 7.01 (briefly describing the Glass-Steagall Act).
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing reserve requirements for
member banks of the Federal Reserve System).
107
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing insurance fund
assessments for FDIC-insured banks).
108
See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing statutory limitations on
paying dividends out of surplus).
109
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing OCC approval
requirement for such dividends).
110
12 U.S.C. § 1831o.
111
See supra Part IV (describing automatic triggering points in PCA regime).
106
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assessment obligations to the FDIC fund) or accounting systems (e.g.,
whether a bank dividend causes a negative balance in the accounting
entries that sum to a bank’s “capital surplus”). Moreover, many of the
formal-mandatory rules apply in narrow, in extremis contexts. For
example, if an institution were unable to pay its modest assessments to
the FDIC—its most important creditor in its capacity of guarantor of
most of its liabilities—it would almost certainly be defaulting on its
other obligations. PCA, on the other hand, was designed to apply not
just at an institution’s death bed—in the parlance of PCA, when it was
“critically undercapitalized”—but also as its health began to decline
and restorative action was possible. From 1991 to 2010, PCA
constituted the most direct source of coercive power that could be
brought to bear on banks, and it also represented the principal means
by which regulators could interfere with bank dividend policy.112
Notwithstanding its novelty as a regulatory technology, its reliance on
intervention triggers, calibrated to precise capital accounting entries,
places the PCA regime firmly within the formal-mandatory tradition of
bank regulation.113

112

It is also noteworthy that PCA is coercive with respect to the supervisors
themselves. See generally George G. Kaufman & George J. Benston, The Intellectual
History of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, in ASSESSING
BANK REFORM: FDICIA ONE YEAR LATER 19 (George G. Kaufman & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1993) (noting that a primary purpose of FDICIA was to restrict regulatory forbearance,
which was perceived to have exacerbated the extent of FDIC losses during the savingsand-loan debacle).
113
FDICIA did more than institute the formal-mandatory PCA regime; it also
played an important role to bolster the informal-discretionary dimension of bank
regulation, discussed at length below. For example, it required bank managers to
attest to the adequacy of internal controls and required bank supervisors to
promulgate standards relating to, and review during examinations, bank risk
management capabilities and internal controls. See § 1831p-1(d) (setting forth
mandate to prescribe safety and soundness standards); Robert F. Weber, An Alternative
Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1027–28
(2013). Even more innovatively, the PCA regime itself authorized supervisors to
reclassify a bank’s PCA capital category (in order to apply PCA restrictions
anticipatorily) if the regulator determines that the bank is engaging in an unsafe or
unsound practice. § 1831o(g)(1) (codifying § 38(g) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act). This Section 38(g) reclassification authority in some ways anticipates the CCAR
program, inasmuch as it relies on both rigid accounting metrics (in the form of the
base PCA categorization) and discretionary actions (in the form of finding an unsafe
and unsound practice to exist). Notwithstanding its innovativeness as a regulatory
technology, Section 38(g) has rarely been utilized by supervisors. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORS’ USE OF
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROVISIONS AND FDIC’S NEW DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM
39–40 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/256614.pdf [hereinafter
GAO PCA REPORT].
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B.

The Informal-Discretionary Dimension of Bank Supervision
Congress inaugurated the informal-discretionary dimension of
bank regulation when it instructed regulators in the Banking Act of
1933 to discipline banks engaging in “unsafe or unsound practices.”114
Today, the most important application of informal-discretionary bank
regulation occurs during the bank examination process, where it exists
in shadow form, casting its influence over the discussions between
examiners and management. During examinations, supervisors
interface regularly with bank management and personnel, especially
risk management departments. According to former FRB Chairman
Ben Bernanke, the heart of the modern bank examination is reviewing
the risk management infrastructure of banks.115 While conducting
examinations, supervisors learn how banks operate and assess how they
manage risks. Supervisors also engage in discussions with management
about how to improve their risk management practices.
These discussions occur against the background threat of
initiating severe supervisory actions—such as cease-and-desist orders
and removal orders that impose lifetime bans on executives or
directors from serving in the industry—predicated on a finding of an
unsafe or unsound practice.116 Other sanctions also apply in the
background, including the ability of supervisors to require prior
approval for executive and board member appointments if the
supervisor finds that the bank or bank holding company is “in a
Supervisors frequently use informal
troubled condition.”117
enforcement mechanisms as well, such as entering into memoranda of
understanding with the bank,118 requiring the bank to execute board
114

See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (describing how the term “unsafe
or unsound practices” entered the banking law lexicon).
115
Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Wash., D.C. (June 12, 2006) (referring to
such review as “the heart of the modern bank examination”); see also Mishkin, supra
note 31, at 16 (“In the ‘supervisory approach’ bank examiners focus less on
compliance with specific regulatory rules and the risks of the financial instruments
currently in the bank’s portfolio and more on the soundness of the bank’s
management practices with regard to controlling risk.”).
116
See supra note 78 (introducing supervisors’ authority to issue cease-and-desist
orders for banks engaging in unsafe and unsound practices); § 1818(e)(1)
(authorizing bank supervisors to initiate removal actions against “institution-affiliated
parties” such as executives and directors where such parties engage in unsafe or
unsound practices that “involve[] personal dishonesty on the part of such party” or
“demonstrate[] willful or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or
soundness of such insured depository institution or business institution”).
117
See § 1831i(a)(1).
118
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION
MANUAL § 5020.1 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/cbem.pdf (defining a memorandum of understanding
between bank supervisor and bank as “a good faith understanding between the bank’s
directorate and the Reserve Bank concerning the principal problems and the bank’s
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resolutions to address problems,119 and extracting a “commitment
letter” from bank management.120 Against the backdrop of this arsenal
of informal and formal enforcement tools, supervisors use their “moral
suasion” to influence bank governance.121 The bank examination
process is shrouded with secrecy, and most information about
communications between examiners and bank personnel is
confidential under applicable agency regulations.122 Consequently, the
mechanics of this process are opaque, and data about bank
examinations and informal enforcement of safety-and-soundness is
unavailable.
We do know, however, that formal enforcement of safety and
soundness is largely non-existent for the largest, most significant
banks. To the extent it is enforced at all, it is done so in an ex post
capacity, as a backwards-looking disciplinary device for past behavior.
Such a status quo is the regulatory path of least resistance. The
supervisory task is complicated because a supervisory intervention
might be justified on safety and soundness grounds before a bank has
formally seen its capital fall below the statutory PCA thresholds that
vest supervisors with mandatory remedial authority.123 For instance,
under applicable judicial precedent, a cease-and-desist order is
certainly appropriate124 where a bank is assuming outsized net positions
in derivatives markets that yield impressive profits but expose the bank
proposed remedies”).
119
The FRB frequently uses board resolutions as an informal supervisory
mechanism. In subsequent examinations, supervisors assess whether the bank has
implemented the board resolutions. See id. § 6000.1.
120
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL NO. 5310-3 app. A (2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/
static/publications/ppm-5310-3.pdf (“A Commitment Letter is a document signed by
the bank’s board of directors on behalf of the bank and is acknowledged by an
authorized OCC official, reflecting specific written commitments to take corrective
actions in response to problems or concerns identified by the OCC in its supervision
of the bank.”).
121
See GAO PCA REPORT, supra note 113, at 40 (defining moral suasion as
“reminding the board of directors that it has an obligation to ensure that the
institution is competently managed”).
122
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 4.36(b) (2015) (“It is the OCC’s policy regarding non-public
OCC information that such information is confidential and privileged. Accordingly,
the OCC will not normally disclose this information to third parties.”); id. § 4.32(b)
(defining “non-public OCC information” broadly to include, among other things,
most communications between supervisory staff and bank personnel).
123
See GAO PCA REPORT, supra note 113, at 41 (“The regulators acknowledged that
section 38 permits them to reclassify an institution’s capital category to dismiss an
officer or director; however, they said that because section 38 only allows them to
dismiss individuals from institutions that are undercapitalized or worse by PCA
standards, the tool generally is not available to them in these good economic times
when all or most of the institutions they regulate are well capitalized.”).
124
See infra notes 179–88 and accompanying text (summarizing judicial
interpretation of “unsafe and unsound practices”).
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to risks that might compromise the bank’s solvency.125 But the event
triggering the regulatory intervention is a corporate practice and the
harm to be avoided is a potential, hypothetical loss—a loss that has not
yet occurred, and quite possibly will never occur. For this reason,
supervisors have historically avoided making formal findings of unsafe
and unsound practices for the largest banks.126
In fact, during the period of 2007–2010, which marks the most
unstable financial market environment in nearly a century, none of the
federal bank supervisors commenced a formal enforcement action
against any of the twenty largest banks or bank holding companies on
safety and soundness grounds. In retrospect, this observation is
staggering.
The large banks continued to return capital to
stockholders through dividends and share repurchases even after the
financial crisis started and the FRB and U.S. Treasury were supporting
markets.127 And supervisors never objected.128 This pre-crisis track
record is unsurprising in light of the minimalist view of supervisors’
legal authority held by some supervisory officials. According to this
passive interpretation of supervisory authority, supervisors lack the
legal authority to object to risky bank lending and business practices.129
This perspective contrasts with the implicit message underlying
125

See, e.g., Justin Baer & Julie Steinberg, Bank Rule Challenges Wall Street, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 11, 2013, at A1 (reporting how revelations that a single J.P. Morgan trader,
nicknamed the “London Whale,” caused his employer to incur multibillion dollar
losses in connection with ill-advised derivatives trades, bolstered the case for tougher
implementation standards of the so-called “Volcker Rule” from the Dodd-Frank Act,
which aimed to require depository institutions to divest or otherwise cease most of
their proprietary trading businesses and private equity activities); Dan Fitzpatrick et
al., J.P. Morgan Ordered to Fix Lapses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2013, at C1 (noting that total
losses from the London Whale scandal eventually amounted to six billion dollars).
126
See Robert F. Weber, Drug Courts for the Banks (2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author) (highlighting historic tendency for supervisors
to enforce safety and soundness norms only on small banks); cf. Julie Anderson Hill,
Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645 (2012)
(registering a similar unwillingness on the part of supervisors to initiate capital
enforcement actions against the twenty-five largest banks).
127
See Hirtle, supra note 5, at 3–4.
128
See Tim P. Clark & Lisa H. Ryu, CCAR and Stress Testing as Complementary
Supervisory Tools, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar-and-stress-testingas-complementary-supervisory-tools.htm (“[T]he continuation of capital distributions
at many large bank holding companies (BHCs) well after it became apparent that
there was substantial deterioration in the operating environment highlights the extent
to which supervisors . . . underestimated the effect that stressed conditions could have
on BHCs’ financial soundness.”).
129
See Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Remarks at
the 2008 Institute of International Finance Membership Meeting: Perspectives on the
Recent
Financial
Turmoil
(Mar.
5,
2008)
at
8,
available
at
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/speechbio/hoenigpdf/hoen
igbrazil3708.pdf [hereinafter Hoenig Brazil Remarks] (“[I]n many situations, there
may be no legal basis for requiring a change in business or lending practices.”).
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Bernanke’s more maximalist position that the heart of the modern
bank examination is supervisory review of risk management and other
corporate systems.130 As a description of legal authority, the minimalist
view is incorrect; but as a positive description of regulatory praxis, the
minimalist view might well be accurate. The lack of publicly available
data concerning informal enforcement complicates any effort to assess
which of the two views is more prevalent, but a recent whistleblower
exposé of the holding company-level examination of Goldman Sachs
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York suggests that the minimalists
have the upper hand and that examiners are not shaping risk
management practices at the largest banks in any meaningful way.131
So too does the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s publicly
announced more conciliatory enforcement posture. Its examiners do
not examine anymore; instead, they manage relationships.132
Instead of prophylactically sanctioning banks engaging in unsafe
and unsound practices uncovered during examinations, supervisors
have historically shown more willingness to enter into consent ceaseand-desist orders predicated on past unsafe and unsound practices that
have already resulted in losses. In that capacity, the regulatory sanction
functions more as a remedy for prior failures than a prophylaxis
against future failures.
We might label these ex post findings of unsafe and unsound
practices, as distinguished from the implicit threat of making ex ante
findings before the practices result in losses. Whereas both types of
findings occur along the informal-discretionary dimension, the latter
are, from political and institutional perspectives, more difficult to
administer.133 Compared with adjudications of past facts, anticipatory
130

See supra note 115 and accompanying text (reporting Bernanke’s comments
that review of risk management function is the “heart” of the modern bank
examination).
131
See Jake Bernstein, Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and a Culture Clash,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/carmen-segarrassecret-recordings-from-inside-new-york-fed; Improving Financial Supervision: Examining
and Addressing Regulatory Capture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer
Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 52 (2014)
(testimony of David O. Beim, Professor, Prof’l Practice, Columbia Bus. Sch. regarding
a report he wrote, commissioned in 2009 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
which identified a “weak form of regulatory capture,” predicated on revolving doors
and information asymmetries, as an institutional shortcoming of bank supervisors),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg93411/pdf/CHRG113shrg93411.pdf.
132
See Caroline Salas & Bradley Keoun, New York Fed’s Dahlgren Overhauls Bank
Supervision to Beef Up Oversight, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2011), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-21/new-york-fed-s-dahlgren-overhaulsbank-supervision-to-beef-up-oversight.
133
Another example of the ex ante application of informal-discretionary
regulation results from the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that large banks prepare
“living wills” that detail how they could be resolved in an orderly manner. Specifically,
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evasions of future hypothetical harms face higher justificatory
hurdles—and the largest banks can employ a cadre of expensive
lawyers to make their case. For example, the OCC made no ex ante
unsafe and unsound practice findings for JPMorgan Chase & Co. over
the past decade, but entered consent cease-and-desist orders
predicated on ex post findings concerning the following unsafe and
unsound practices: the “robo-signing” scandal,134 the “London Whale”
trading losses,135 custodial service failures in connection with the
Madoff fraud,136 and anti-money laundering control failures.137 In each
of these cases, supervisors disciplined the bank in the aftermath of highly
salient reports of corporate failures.
This informal-discretionary examination process is a dialogic,
negotiated governance setting.138 It has the potential to influence
the Act authorizes the FRB to order asset divestitures in the event that the FRB finds a
bank’s resolution plans are not “credible”—a determination committed to the FRB’s
discretion. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2011) (providing that FRB
can require resubmission of initial proposed living will and authorizing divestiture
powers where the resubmitted plan constitutes a “failure to submit [a] credible plan”).
134
JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2011-050 (Dep’t of Treasury Apr. 13, 2011), available
at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2011-050.pdf (consent ceaseand-desist order arising out of findings of unsafe or unsound practices in residential
mortgage servicing and initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings).
135
JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2013-001 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 14, 2013), available
at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-001.pdf (consent ceaseand-desist order arising out of findings of unsafe or unsound practices in the credit
derivatives trading strategy implemented by the bank’s “chief investment office” that
resulted in six billion dollars in losses to the bank); see also supra note 125 and
accompanying text (providing more details of the “London Whale” episode).
136
JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2014-001 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 7. 2014), available
at
http://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/enforcement-actions/bankenforcement-actions/civil-money-penalties/ea-2014-001.pdf (consent cease-and-desist
order arising out of findings of unsafe and unsound practices in, among other things,
custodial services for Madoff investment funds).
137
JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2013-002 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 14, 2013), available
at
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ-2013-8a.pdf
(consent cease-and-desist order arising out of findings of unsafe or unsound practices
in deficient anti-money laundering compliance program).
138
Notwithstanding the lack of formal enforcement efforts against large banks
along the informal-discretionary dimension of bank regulation, the principle that
corporate practices, rather than outputs, are proper subjects of regulatory control is
hardly novel or controversial. Michael Power has observed that such regulatory
directives “turn organizations inside out”—that is, they divert the gaze of internal and
external governance systems from externally verifiable performance outputs (such as
the PCA’s capitalization levels) to the internal and auditable organizational processes
on which the performance outputs depend. Michael Power, The Risk Management of
Everything: Rethinking the politics of uncertainty, DEMOS (2004), http://
www.demos.co.uk/files/riskmanagementofeverything.pdf. They eschew reliance on
precise calculations in favor of a focus on how institutions process, respond to, and
prepare for contingencies. Cary Coglianese and David Lazer have referred to this
method of regulatory governance as “management-based regulation.” See Cary
Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management
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dividend policy if bank regulators consider and discuss with bank
management whether declaring dividends under certain
circumstances could constitute an unsafe and unsound practice. The
designation of a past or proposed dividend as an unsafe and unsound
practice, like the violation of a formal-mandatory prescription, triggers
a suite of coercive sanctions. The determination itself, however, is
highly context-specific and idiosyncratic, and requires a high degree
of discretionary judgment on the part of the regulator. In that respect,
it differs dramatically from the triggering event in the formalmandatory dimension, which is usually an accounting shortfall or
payment. In this context, the exercise of administrative discretion is
not, on account of the indeterminacy of the triggering event,
susceptible to a lawmaking approach characterized by general
applicability and precise accounting metrics. When bank regulators
consider whether declaring or paying a dividend constitutes an unsafe
and unsound practice, they engage in a forward-looking analytic exercise
that requires them to take into account how a dividend might affect
the bank under future, hypothetical states of the world. This exercise
contrasts sharply with the formal-mandatory dimension, which relies
on processing precise and current calculations (of, e.g., “capital
surplus”) through a binary decision matrix—that is, either the
dividend is illegal because it would deplete the surplus or it is legal
because it would not. Professor Mehrsa Baradaran has coined the apt
term “regulation by hypothetical” to capture the idea that
governmental power is deployed based on indeterminate and
hypothetical informational inputs.139 Moreover, the discretionary
quality of the agency’s determination invites all relevant actors to
deliberate on the risks facing the business and to reconsider their
perspectives as the future unfolds.140

to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003). They look at corporate and
managerial practices rather than accounting metrics, and as such are more amenable
to informal discussions and discretionary judgment.
139
See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1249
(2014) (“Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules duly promulgated under
appropriate statutory and regulatory mechanisms that require banks and their
regulators today to make predictions about sources of crisis and weakness tomorrow.
Those predictions—which, by their very definition, are conjectural and speculative,
even hypothetical—then become the basis of the use of the state’s regulatory power.”).
140
See Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside
the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 470 (2012).
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Integrating the Informal-Discretionary Dimension into the Broader
Literature on “Risk Regulation”

When acting pursuant to the informal-discretionary dimension,
bank supervisors exercise their regulatory discretion to intervene in
activity based on the risk of future, uncertain, hypothetical adverse
outcomes—in other words, on outcomes that might occur, but have
not yet occurred. These interventions can be situated in a broader
literature on “risk regulation” in the environmental, health, and safety
regulatory contexts. In particular, they share with these risk regulatory
regimes a statutory trigger mechanism predicated on a necessarily
uncertain harm. In other words, the legality of the regulatory
intervention depends on a determination that is subject to some
amount of uncertainty. This marriage of uncertainty and law is
unavoidably fraught with weighty concerns—about accountability,
legitimacy, science, and even democracy—that are outside the scope
of this Article, but the parallels drawn here demonstrate that the
informal-discretionary dimension is quite active in other areas of
administrative law.
Risk regulation is a slippery moniker with a range of related, but
rarely identical, connotations.141 To some extent, the varied uses of the
term reflect theoretical and disciplinary differences in the ways risk is
conceived.142 Any attempt to define risk regulation, however, must start
with the burst of environmental, health, and safety regulation that
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. This legislative activity was the
political expression of increased societal concerns over latent and
uncertain dangers to health and the environment resulting from new
technologies in the latter part of the twentieth century.143 David
141

See Elizabeth Fisher, Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical Reflection, 2 EURO. J. RISK
REG. 125, 126 (2013).
142
See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE
CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 20–21 (Tom Baker & Jonathan
Simon eds., 2002) [hereinafter EMBRACING RISK] (registering transatlantic divide in
conceptions of the idea of risk regulation); NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 1–4 (1993) (registering disciplinary divides in the conception of risk more
generally).
143
Sheila Jasanoff, Risk in Hindsight—Towards a Politics of Reflection, in RISK SOCIETY
AND THE CULTURE OF PRECAUTION 28, 30 (Ingo K. Richter et al. eds., 2006) (“In the
latter half of the terrifying twentieth century, risk became a major concern of
governments.”); NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS 1 (1983) [hereinafter NRC RED BOOK] (“The decade of the
1970s was a period of heightened public concern about the effects of technology on
the environment.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 11 (2002) (arguing that “commitments [embodied in 1970s
environmentalism] helped to spur national risk regulation in [the] United States (and
elsewhere)”); William Boyd, Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s1970s, 39
ECOLOGY L.Q. 895, 897 (2012).
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Garland describes this process as an adjunct to that of development:
“[h]istory has caught up with modern societies, causing them to focus
less and less upon technical and economic development, and more
and more upon the problem of managing the hazards that this
development entails.”144 Whether we are living in a new age of higher
statistical probabilities of catastrophic risks occurring—in something
akin to what Ulrich Beck famously labeled a “risk society”—is a
contestable proposition.145 But it is not contestable that much of
regulatory praxis today, in the United States and abroad, consists of
initiatives aiming to reduce exposures to future uncertain hazards.
Ulrich Beck argues that this increased risk consciousness impacts
the way people and organizations, including regulatory agencies, act:
“the actual social impetus of risks lies in the projected dangers of the
future.”146 “We become active today,” Beck continues, “in order to
prevent, alleviate or take precautions against the problems and crises
of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow—or not to do so.”147 Whatever
the underlying societal causes of this increased governmental attention
to risk, it is plausible to refer to a new “risk state” or “risk regulatory
state” in which the predicate for current action is the prospect of future
harm.148 As a result, risk has become an organizing principle of
144

David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48, 74 (Richard V. Ericson
& Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).
145
See, e.g., ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A
COMPLEX WORLD 30 (2008) (observing that “[t]he novel character of risk does not
seem as novel as Beck claims”); IAIN WILKINSON, ANXIETY IN A RISK SOCIETY 108 (2001)
(“For Beck, actuarial guarantees of safety are irrelevant in light of the knowledge that
there are still rare occasions where the statistically improbable event of disaster takes
place.”); IAIN WILKINSON, RISK, VULNERABILITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (2010) (“Beck’s
representation of the reality of the risks we face is open to a great deal of critical debate
and he readily admits to this.”); Sophie Day, The Politics of Risk Among London Prostitutes,
in RISK REVISITED 29, 51 (Pat Caplan ed., 2000) (“Much of what Beck describes . . . has
long been standard for those without much money or control over their lives.”); Mary
Douglas, Risk as a Forensic Resource, 119 DAEDALUS 1, 8 (1990) (claiming that while
modern technological risks are “only too horribly real,” the distinguishing feature of
contemporary risk discourse is that it, like sin and taboo in former times, posits a causal
relationship between behaviors and decisions and real-world danger in an effort to
protect a valued institution—in our case, individual liberty); Peter Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 277 (1985) (arguing that the legal system is unduly preoccupied with and biased
against “public risks,” defined as “threats to human health and safety that are centrally
or mass-produced, broadly distributed, and largely outside the individual risk bearer’s
direct understanding and control”); Nikolas Rose, The Death of the Social?, 25 ECON. &
SOC’Y 327, 341–43 (1996) (arguing that heightened attention to risk results from a
“strategic shift . . . in the politics of security” whereby individuals are urged by
politicians to “re-responsibiliz[e]” themselves for the management of their own risks).
146
ULRICH BECK, THE RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 34 (1992).
147
Id.
148
See Julia Black, The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF REGULATION 302, 302 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).
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governments,149 and regulation increasingly reflects, and also
nourishes, a new moral climate of risk politics that conceives of and
expects regulatory initiatives to affect the future by identifying risks
and allocating risk burdens.150
The newness of state intervention into risk should not be
overstated. To that end, two caveats are in order. The first caveat is
dealt with more straightforwardly. The judiciary (itself an organ of the
state) has long concerned itself with risk allocation, albeit in an ex post
capacity. The risk regulation era sees the role of law transformed from
the guarantor of ex post compensation for harms through court
systems to ex ante risk mitigator of harms through regulatory
initiatives.151
The second caveat is that, to some extent, all regulatory systems
aim to control some form of risk, broadly defined.152 Traditional
economic regulation was concerned with managing the effects of
monopoly or state-granted privileges.153
Later on, legislators
envisioned a role for regulation in correcting information
asymmetries. It is possible to say, for example, that utility rate
regulation was designed to prevent the “risk” that monopolistic pricing
practices would afflict the electricity market, or that securities
registration requirements aim to reduce the “risk” that retail investors
are bilked by investor promoters. Some authors categorize regulatory
programs to correct for negative externalities within the risk regulatory

149

See Applegate, supra note 103, at 305.
See ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING OUR
LIVES 47–48 (2000); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MODERN
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (referring to the “new moral climate of politics” that characterizes
risk policy).
151
See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 417 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds.,
Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (contrasting liability regimes with
regimes that prevent an “injury has not yet materialized or is not immediately
threatening”); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 3 (2003) (“By the late 1960s, Congress had
determined that the tort system, augmented by minimal federal regulation, was
incapable of providing an effective response to the increasing threats to the public
health and safety and the environment attributable to new technologies and
development.”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Risk Regulation and Governance Institutions, in RISK
AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 133, 141 (2010).
152
See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 79 n.72 (2012).
153
See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 5–6 (1983) (contrasting economic regulation and risk regulation (which the
author refers to as “social regulation,” a designation that underscores the broad sweep
of risk regulatory regimes)).
150
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family;154 others place them outside.155 The demarcation lines between
traditional economic regulation and modern risk regulation are
anything but bright. Contributing to the muddle, some authors simply
use “risk regulation” as shorthand for the environmental, health, and
safety regulatory regimes that gave rise to the term, with no attempt
made to distinguish between regulatory systems’ normative precepts or
design-related mechanics.156 Bearing this caveat in mind, the essential
attribute of a new and distinct model of risk regulation emerges more
clearly: risk regulation requires regulators to exercise their discretion
in settings where scientific uncertainty is unavoidable.157
In order to appreciate the distinctive attributes of this new risk
state and how it deals with the scientific uncertainty problem, it is
necessary to examine its legal-institutional structure in more concrete
detail. Shapiro and Glicksman identify two essential features of risk
regulatory programs.158 First, the legislature designs a statutory trigger
that permits an agency to act on the basis of anticipated harm. Second,
the legislature assigns the agency a statutory standard specifying the level
or stringency with which it should regulate the harm and the factors it
may consider in doing so. Fisher expresses the same idea in slightly
different terms: debates about risk regulation are about how to evaluate
risk, a task that requires risk appraisal and standard setting.159 Thus, for
instance, a statutory trigger might, as in the Clean Air Act, require that
the regulator demonstrate that the public or environment is exposed
to a risk factor (e.g., airborne pollution) at a level that is potentially
dangerous before a regulatory intervention is legally permissible.160 As
154

See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23–26 (1982) (including
in a general discussion of regulation objectives the mitigation of “spillover” effects of
otherwise private activity); MELNICK, supra note 153, at 5–6 (stating that the “purpose
of recent [risk] regulation” is to reduce risks created by, among other things,
“externalities”).
155
See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 152, at 81–82 (distinguishing on normative
grounds “the familiar objective of eliminating specific inefficiencies that distort market
dynamics” (which the author calls “economic regulation”) and “the more fundamental
problems posed by the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in the financial
system” (which the author analogizes to risk regulation)).
156
See Black, supra note 148, at 305 (making this point, not contributing to the
muddle).
157
See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 50
(1990); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL L.
1083, 1087 (2007) (noting that Congress intended for risk regulators to “make
regulatory decisions on the basis of imperfect scientific knowledge”) (citations
omitted).
158
See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 151, at 31–45.
159
ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 6–
7 (2007).
160
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“The Administrator shall . . . publish . . .
a list of categories of stationary sources [of pollution]. He shall include a category of
sources in such list if in his judgment it causes, or contributes significantly to, air
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for the statutory standard, a legislature might instruct the regulator to
require firms to use the “best available technology” or adopt a
particular corporate best practice “to the extent feasible.”161
Alternatively, the legislature might adopt a more restrictive standard,
requiring a risk regulator to demonstrate that the expected benefits of
a regulation exceed its costs.162 Inevitably, the regulatory process
requires some recourse to science and statistical data, and a wide range
of opinions exist with respect to how this information is best integrated
into the regulatory process.163 A full exploration of these issues is
outside the scope of this Article, but it suffices to say for now that these
intramural conflicts are nowhere close to being resolved.164
The relevance of the risk regulation literature to the informaldiscretionary dimension of bank supervision should be apparent. In
both settings, the regulatory task requires the regulator to determine
whether a statutory trigger test has been met by referring to an
assessment of the risk that a future, uncertain outcome will transpire.
Moreover, both settings also necessitate a trade-off, guided by the
statutory standard, between protection against risks and the costs of
providing that protection.165
So what explains the historical disinclination on the part of legal
scholars studying financial regulation to appreciate the relevance of
the rich risk regulation literature—especially when the robust debate
is occurring just down the hallway in the offices of their environmental
law and administrative law colleagues? Some care should be taken not
to paint with too broad a brush; some commentators have perceptively
flagged the similarities between risk regulation and financial
regulation. Perhaps in recognition of the trenchant association of risk
regulation with environmental, health, and safety regulation,166 they
have done so cautiously, pointing out that to date financial regulation
has not yet been admitted to the club.167 In any event, so far the idea
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”)
(emphasis added).
161
See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 151, at 38.
162
See id. at 39–40.
163
See Martin Kusch, Toward a Political Philosophy of Risk: Experts and Publics in
Deliberative Democracy, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 133–39 (Tim Lewens
ed., 2007) (contrasting Cass Sunstein’s enthusiasm for quantitative, technocratic costbenefit analysis with Sheila Jasanoff’s skepticism of technical scientific experts in the
regulatory process).
164
But cf. Fisher, supra note 141, at 128 (lamenting that “the risk assessment/risk
management framework,” which relies heavily on technocratic cost-benefit analysis in
the assessment stage, “has become the dominant account of risk regulation”).
165
See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 151, at 21; Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1028 n.2 (1990) (“The
objective . . . is to minimize the sum of the costs of risk and the costs of avoiding risk.”).
166
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167
See Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of
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that risk regulation is really about protecting health, safety, and the
environment—and, by implication, not about financial regulation—
has proven sticky.
In a sense, this phenomenon is counterintuitive. After all,
financial regulators have been regulating risk and supervising riskcreating, risk-taking, risk-profiting institutions since well before the
1960s and 1970s.168 There are lexical and institutional explanations for
the lack of communication between the financial regulation and risk
regulation camps that still require significant exploration from both
risk regulation and financial regulation scholars. Future research will
undoubtedly advance our understanding of how the informaldiscretionary mode of banking supervision fits into risk regulatory
theory more broadly, but for present purposes the important point is
to register how this particular corner of financial regulation resonates
in perhaps unexpected ways with well-established traditions in other
administrative law settings.
D.

A Hypothetical Example: Hipobank’s Ukrainian Operations

To better understand the advantages of the forward-looking
orientation of the informal-discretionary mode of banking supervision,
consider how the rigid PCA regime is ill equipped to address the
following hypothetical scenario. Imagine that a large, federally
chartered bank named HipoBank, in response to retrenchment from
its competitors, significantly ramps up its syndicated loan operations
(through its Moscow, London, and Kiev branches) for large and midsized Russian and Ukrainian corporate clients, despite the unrest in
those nations. HipoBank has historically had strong relationships with
Russian clients, due to it being one of the most active Western banks
to underwrite, through its London branch office, initial public
offerings of privatized assets following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, HipoBank’s risk managers are under the impression that
its competitors are overestimating the political risk and war risk of
lending operations in Russia and the Ukraine, and they believe that
the conflict will resolve itself shortly and without further violence.169
Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2048 (2013) (“At least in the
conventional sense, meanwhile, the SEC is not a risk regulator. Agencies such as the
EPA, OSHA, NHTSA, and the like—with their focus on human health and safety—
have traditionally been thought to represent the universe of risk regulators.”);
Omarova, supra note 152, at 80 n.75 (“U.S. banking law has strong elements of risk
regulation, insofar as it seeks to prevent systemic effects of bank failure and to
safeguard the federal deposit insurance fund.”). See also FISHER, supra note 159, at 6
(expressly mentioning financial regulation as an arena where risk regulatory principles
could apply).
168
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
169
The hypothetical will consider the effects of managerial judgment of political
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Initially, the increased portfolio of Russian and Ukrainian loans—
forming part of HipoBank’s “Central and Eastern European
Corporate,” or “CEEC,” unit—performs well, and lower competition
results in higher interest rates. The decision to take on more CEEC
business, in short, results in handsome profits for the unit and the bank
at large.
What are bank supervisors170 to do if they believe the risk from
Ukrainian and Russian corporate loans is much higher than the bank
believes—so much so that the solvency of the bank and the stability of
the holding company might be threatened? What if regulators
determine that payment of the normal dividend to bank stockholders
would deprive the bank of the added capital cushion that the
supervisor believes the bank should maintain to protect itself against
unexpected CEEC losses?171 The problem is that until the risk—here,
a political risk or war risk associated with the conflict in the Ukraine—
has materialized and resulted in losses, it will not affect the accounting
and payments systems to which the PCA regime and other dividend
regulations are calibrated. In other words, it will not raise any red flags
along the formal-mandatory dimension of bank supervision. In fact, if
anything, the build-up of Ukraine risk will result in lowered supervisory
surveillance, inasmuch as the enhanced profits, in the short term, will
boost CEEC results and make the bank appear on more solid footing
than before the decision to expand that portfolio.172 Turning to the
initial question, what is a supervisor to do in such circumstances? Can
the supervisor order the bank to suspend or reduce its normal
dividend or otherwise reduce its distributions to stockholders in order
to preserve capital to hold against what the supervisor anticipates to be
an impending rash of CEEC loan losses?
and war risk, but not of sanctions-related liabilities or risks.
170
In this fictional case of HipoBank, the relevant supervisors would be the OCC
(as the primary supervisor of HipoBank itself) and the FRB (as the supervisor of
HipoBank’s holding company).
171
The supervisor obviously expects the CEEC business will result in losses, so in a
colloquial sense it might seem incongruous to describe such losses as unexpected. But
in financial accounting parlance, expected losses result in loan loss provisions (also
known as “valuation reserves”), which reduce earnings on the income statement and
assets on the balance sheet, in turn resulting in reduced capital (which, after all,
represents the difference between the now-reduced assets and the static liabilities). See
JOHN DOWNS & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 775 (7th ed. 2006) [hereinafter FINANCE DICTIONARY]. If the bank has not
established a loan loss provision, the loss is not described as “expected.”
172
In particular, the increased profitability of the CEEC unit will result in increased
earnings or income, which in turn will increase retained earnings and, eventually,
capital. See infra note 184 (discussing tendency of some commentators to view safety
and soundness through the lens of profitability). This analysis assumes that the CEEC
profits are not distributed to stockholders as dividends or used to repurchase
outstanding shares of stock of HipoBank or its holding company.
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The preliminary answer is deceptively simple: remember that the
supervisors wield the power to issue a cease-and-desist order on
regulated banks engaging in practices the supervisor has determined
to be “unsafe or unsound.”173 By designating aspects of the CEEC
business, as presently conducted, as unsafe and unsound practices,
supervisors could take any number of actions, including ordering
Hipobank to hedge its Ukraine and Russia exposures, cease
origination of new loans, or even divest its CEEC business altogether.174
Of course, they could also issue a cease-and-desist order mandating
that it suspend any dividend payments. And their arsenal is not limited
to cease-and-desist orders. Supervisors could also order the removal of
(and lifetime industry bans for) bank management or directors under
Section 8(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.175 They could even
withdraw federal deposit insurance,176 which would likely precipitate a
run on the bank that would result in the bank’s conservatorship.177
When deliberating on whether a practice is unsafe or unsound,
supervisors must take into account how current business practices might
result in losses in a contingent future world state. The inquiry is
conjectural and counterfactual, and radically different than the
mechanical inquiries of the formal-mandatory dimension, which rely
on accounting metrics. In this example, the supervisor must ask itself
“what might go wrong here, and how severe might the consequences be
173

See supra note 78 and accompanying text (introducing authority to issue cease
and desist orders).
174
The cease-and-desist order could take the form of a temporary restraining order
issued before a hearing takes place. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (2012).
175
See § 1818(e). The Section 8(e) action would impose a higher burden of proof
on the supervisors, who must prove that the institution-affiliated party engaged in
personal dishonesty or acted with willful disregard for the safety and soundness of the
bank. See supra note 116 (introducing Section 8(e) actions).
176
See § 1818(a) (empowering the FDIC to initiate process for withdrawal of its
deposit insurance where agency finds that “an insured depository institution or the
directors or trustees of an insured depository institution have engaged or are engaging
in unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of the depository
institution”). In practice, withdrawal of deposit insurance would only be deployed as
a sanction for small and mid-sized banks. While the FDIC is keen to avoid recourse to
its deposit insurance fund, a run on a large bank could lead to a crisis in confidence,
further bank failures, and far greater depletion of the insurance fund. Cf. GARTEN,
supra note 20, at 41 (“Although the regulators could commence a proceeding to
terminate a bank’s deposit insurance, this power was not likely to be used.”).
177
See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (demonstrating importance of deposit insurance
to prevention of runs on compromised banks). Such a run would follow Gresham’s
Law, which states that when there are two forms of money (in this case, insured
deposits and uninsured deposits), the overvalued bad money drives out the good
money. See FINANCE DICTIONARY, supra note 171, at 297. Legally fixed parity does not
convince money users that the value of two different instruments is the same. Savers
hoard the good money (in this case, the insured deposits), and rush to circulate, or
otherwise convert, the bad money (in this case, the newly uninsured deposits).
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if such outcomes were to materialize?” Given the potential severity of
the sanction—e.g., a government agency ordering a bank not to pay
dividends to its stockholders178—the power to designate a business
practice as unsafe or unsound might be thought to raise due process
concerns. But courts have consistently rejected due process challenges
to bank supervisory safety and soundness actions, reasoning that
Congress put in place a scheme for aggrieved parties to seek redress
both within the agency and, if necessary, the courts.179
Indeed, the courts have approved broad and indeterminate
agency interpretations of the scope of unsafe and unsound practices.
As mentioned earlier, they have largely ratified the open-ended
interpretation of “unsafe and unsound practices” proffered by
Chairman Horne in his 1966 Congressional testimony—that is, a bank
action or inaction is unsafe or unsound if “it is contrary to generally
accepted standards of prudent operation” and if its “possible
consequences . . . if continued” would include “abnormal risk or loss
or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agenc[y]
administering the [FDIC] insurance fund.”180 The D.C. Circuit has
held that an “unsafe or unsound practice” is one that poses a
“reasonably foreseeable [and] undue risk to the institution.”181 The
Third Circuit, again picking up on Horne’s language, ruled that an
“imprudent act . . . posing an abnormal risk to the financial stability of
the banking institution would qualify” as an unsafe or unsound
practice.182 The Ninth Circuit has stated explicitly what is implicit from
Horne’s definition: namely, that a bank need not even be insolvent for
its supervisor to initiate proceedings on safety and soundness
grounds.183

178

See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing supervisory authority to
issue cease and desist orders).
179
See Seidman v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 37 F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
due process challenge to OTS Section 8(e) removal order alleging that the same
agency—indeed, the same individual—was acting as investigator, prosecutor, and
adjudicator of charges based on unsafe and unsound practices); Nw. Nat’l Bank v.
United States, 917 F.2d 1111, 1119 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting due process challenge of
OCC decision to pursue cease and desist order to discipline bank management for
unsafe and unsound practices instead of Section 8(e) removal order, which required
a higher standard of proof); Hoffman v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 912 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting bank’s argument that due process required FDIC to demonstrate
the bank was insolvent before entering order withdrawing deposit insurance on
account of an unsafe and unsound practice).
180
Horne Testimony, supra note 80; see also supra note 81 (citing cases ratifying
Horne’s interpretation).
181
Kaplan v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 104 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
182
See Seidman, 37 F.3d at 928.
183
Hoffman, 912 F.2d at 1175.
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Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit clarified in Landry v. FDIC in 2000
that it is no defense that the imprudent actions did not ultimately
result in losses to the bank.184 In that case, the FDIC brought a Section
8(e) removal order against a bank executive for self-dealing activities
that exposed a bank185—and, in the process, the FDIC in its capacity as
guarantor of most of the bank’s liabilities—to “abnormal risks,”
including “at least one large loan to an uncreditworthy out-of-territory
borrower, long-term contracts with consultants whose fees were
proportionately greater than the services rendered, and the use of
[b]ank funds for travel and related expenses in pursuit of
breathtakingly irresponsible schemes.”186 The defendant argued that
the FDIC erred in finding that the practices were unsafe or unsound
because, whatever the risks might have been, the bank was profitable
throughout the period in question.187 The court retorted that its
inquiry was risk-focused, not outcome-focused; where a bank takes an
imprudent action that results in reasonably foreseeable abnormal risks
to the institution, a supervisor is authorized to make an unsafe and
unsound practice finding.188 Again, the question is what might happen
(or what might have happened had things turned out otherwise), not
what did happen. The contrast with dividend regulation and the PCA
regime, as traditionally conceived, could not be starker.
Viewing dividend regulation through these formal-mandatory
and informal-discretionary lenses reveals a troubling state of affairs.
On the one hand, the formal-mandatory tools have become largely
obsolete. On the other hand, regulators exhibit hesitancy, even
unwillingness, to use informal-discretionary tools to limit bank
dividends. More troublingly, these patterns are generalizable beyond
dividend regulation. But dividend regulation is where the FRB has
created a possible solution to the problem. Its new CCAR program is
both rigid and forward-looking. It allows regulators to consider the
effects of future hypothetical scenarios on a bank, but also tethers
184

Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This is an important
clarification, as many commentators view safety and soundness through the lens of
profit and loss. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 101, 190 (2008) (“[Federal bank supervisory] agencies are designed with a
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. This means
protecting banks’ profitability.”). According to this view, practices are safe and sound
if they increase a bank’s earnings, which can only increase, and never decrease, a
bank’s capital. The Landry court ratifies the bank supervisory agencies’ view that the
nature of risk requires that accounting profits alone cannot be the touchstone of safety
and soundness.
185
See supra note 175 and accompanying text (explaining supervisory power to
issue Section 8(e) removal orders).
186
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1138.
187
Id.
188
See id. (“Just as a loss, without more, does not prove that an act posed an
abnormal risk, a profit does not establish its absence.”) (citations omitted).
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those scenarios to a system of rigid numerical trigger points that
require intervention by regulators. This latter point is important
because it is a potential antidote to regulators’ historical tendency
towards inaction based on what they perceive to be future, conjectural
risks of loss.
VI. INTRODUCING THE COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEW
The new CCAR regulatory initiative represents the most sweeping
governmental intervention into bank dividend and distribution policy
to date. It is also noteworthy because it unites, for the first time, the
forward-looking, counterfactual analysis of the informal-discretionary
dimension of bank supervision with the precise, outcome-focused
orientation of the formal-mandatory dimension. In the process, it has
supplanted the PCA regime as the primary lever of governmental
power over U.S. banks and their holding companies. FRB Governor
Daniel Tarullo has stated that the combination of the CCAR program
and the mandatory stress testing program constitutes a “building out”
of a “more dynamic, more macroprudential, and more data-driven”
bank regulatory framework.189 He might also have added that
supervisors have performed a volte-face and turned their gaze from the
past towards the future, without jettisoning the precise accounting
metrics on which regimes like the PCA depend.
With this new regulatory program, the FRB now (1) requires
banks to consider the effects of hypothetical stress test scenarios on
their balance sheets and (2) makes banks’ ability to distribute
corporate property to their stockholders (including, most obviously,
by paying dividends) contingent on banks having in place a sufficient
capital cushion to withstand the stress scenarios. As a result, the ability
of banks to make capital distributions—the most basic method by
which equity investors obtain returns on their investment—has been
made contingent and contestable to an unprecedented degree.
A. Mechanics of the CCAR Program
For all its importance and novelty, the CCAR program is really an
add-on to the FRB’s stress testing initiatives. Since 2011, the DoddFrank Act has required the FRB to conduct annual stress tests of bank
holding companies with total consolidated assets greater than fifty
billion dollars and of financial institutions designated by the Financial
189

Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the Federal Reserve Third Annual Stress Test Modeling Symposium, Boston,
Massachusetts: Stress Testing after Five Years 1 (June 25, 2014) [hereinafter Tarullo
Remarks] (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/tarullo20140625a.pdf).
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Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically important.190 The
FRB implemented this DFAST191 stress testing mandate as part of its
new Regulation YY, which consists of a suite of enhanced prudential
requirements applicable to such large financial organizations. Subpart
E of Regulation YY sets forth the administrative details of the DFAST
tests and labels companies subject to the testing requirements as
“covered companies.”192 The DFAST program projects revenues,
expenses, losses, and the resulting post-stress capital ratios based on
three hypothetical scenarios of increasing degrees of stress severity: a
baseline scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse
scenario.193 By measuring the capital ratios, it functions as a sort of
hypothetical PCA regime, but in a purely diagnostic capacity; the
DFAST stress tests themselves have no coercive or prescriptive
consequences.
Congress elected to commit matters of stress scenario design
entirely to the supervisors’ discretion.194 In implementing the DFAST
program, the FRB has announced that its severely adverse scenarios
will contain macroeconomic (i.e., economy-wide) and microeconomic
(i.e., institution-specific) assumptions. As a macroeconomic matter,
the severely adverse scenario is designed to reflect, at a minimum, the
economic and financial conditions typical of a severe recession.195 A
microeconomic scenario might involve a default by the covered
company’s most significant counterparty.196 The FRB has also
announced that its severely adverse scenario will include a “market
shock” to the portfolios of covered companies with large trading
exposures.197 The FRB then applies the scenarios in a rigid and
uniform manner to all covered companies to see how they would

190

12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) & (i)(1) (2012). The institutions subject to these tests are
also required to conduct their own internal stress tests based on (i) the FRB-designed
scenarios and (ii) an additional internally-designed scenario. See Weber, supra note
12, at 2292–93.
191
The DFAST designation refers to Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests. See supra note
12 and accompanying text.
192
12 C.F.R. § 252.42(f) (2015).
193
Id.; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST
2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2 (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_201303
14.pdf [hereinafter 2013 DFAST RESULTS].
194
See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (requiring the FRB to conduct supervisory stress tests
but not setting forth any guidance or requirements with respect to scenario design).
195
Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 78 Fed.
Reg. 71,435, 71,443 (Nov. 29, 2013), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-1129/pdf/2013-27009.pdf.
196
See id. at 71,442.
197
See id. at 71,442–43.
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respond in the event the scenarios in fact materialized.198 Specifically,
the FRB requests specific data sets from the covered companies. The
FRB then projects revenues, expenses, losses, and capital ratios by
inputting the requested data into the FRB’s own mathematical
models.199
The DFAST results grow teeth when they are combined with the
subsequent CCAR program, pursuant to which the FRB requires each
covered company to submit an annual capital plan to the FRB.200
Recognizing that the DFAST and CCAR programs together constitute
the most significant supervisory reform at least since the 1991 PCA
reform, the FRB has been careful to legitimate these programs by
pointing to the sources of authority pursuant to which they were
undertaken. In its final rule for the CCAR program, the FRB invoked
its longstanding expectation—occasionally emphasized but rarely
enforced—that bank holding companies operate with capital positions
well in excess of those set forth in the PCA rules.201 The FRB also cited
a Dodd-Frank Act mandate that the FRB identify, measure, and
monitor risks to financial stability, and impose heightened prudential
standards on large bank holding companies.202 Furthermore, Section
166 of the Dodd-Frank Act provided an important statutory
authorization for the CCAR program.203 That section instructs the FRB
to “prescribe regulations establishing requirements to provide for the
early remediation of financial distress” at a covered company.204 Like
PCA, Section 166 contemplated ratcheted supervisory measures that
“increase in stringency as the financial condition of the [covered]
company declines”—including, most importantly for present
purposes, “limits on capital distributions.”205 But unlike PCA, Section
166 authorizes the FRB to calibrate its supervisory measures not only
198

2013 DFAST RESULTS, supra note 193, at 3.
See id. at 1.
200
Capital Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,631, 74,633–34 (Dec. 1, 2011) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 225.8 (2015)) [hereinafter Capital Plans].
201
Id. at 74,632.
202
Id.
203
See id.
204
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 166, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5366 (2012).
205
§ 166(c)(2)(A). In a report to Congress mandated by Section 202(g)(4) of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the Treasury Department noted the similarities between the FRB’s
new Section 166 responsibilities and the PCA regime. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION 6 (2012), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%20PCA%20
Report%20FINAL.pdf (“Importantly, section 166 requires the FRB to include liquidity
measures, and other forward-looking indicators in addition to regulatory capital in the
early remediation framework. While section 166 and the PCA framework are separate,
implementation of new rules under section 166 could provide regulators with
additional experience to inform potential modifications to the PCA framework.”).
199
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to actual and current regulatory capital ratios, but also to “other
forward-looking indicators.”206 Here, Congress seems to invite bank
supervisors, with express statutory language, to experiment with
informal-discretionary initiatives styled after risk regulation programs.
Whatever its statutory authorization, the historical genesis of the
CCAR program can be traced to the FRB’s 2009 Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (SCAP), an ad hoc program consisting of a series
of publicly disclosed stress tests to assess capital adequacy of large
banking organizations.207 The SCAP did not require banks to describe
their dividend plans (in part because nearly all banks had significantly
cut back dividends in response to the financial crisis), although it did
require banks to accept capital directly from the U.S. Treasury if they
failed to demonstrate that they had sufficient capital to support
lending in the stress scenarios.208 In 2011, the FRB conducted its first
review of planned capital distributions in light of stress scenarios, in a
program that, for the first time, bore the CCAR name.209 With this ad
hoc 2011 exercise, the FRB assessed, on a prospective basis, the capital
adequacy and the internal capital planning processes of the nineteen
largest bank holding companies. The nineteen banks subject to this
exercise were the same banks subject to the 2009 SCAP program.210
Shortly thereafter, in December of 2011, the FRB promulgated a
final rule, entitled “Capital Plans” (the Capital Plans rule, or the
Capital Plans program), requiring all covered companies to submit an
annual capital plan to the FRB.211 This new rule transformed these
initially ad hoc assessments of capital adequacy and capital planning
practices into a regular feature of the supervisory regime for this new
class of covered companiesthat is, all large bank holding companies
(not just those who had participated in the 2009 SCAP exercise) and

206

§ 166(c)(1).
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2012: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR STRESS SCENARIO
PROJECTIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/bcreg20120313a1.pdf [hereinafter 2012 CCAR RESULTS] (noting that the
bank holding companies subject to the first CCAR were “the same institutions that
participated in the 2009 [SCAP] [p]rogram”); Timothy Geithner, How We Tested the Big
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A33 (explaining the SCAP stress test exercise).
208
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2009), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf.
209
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW: OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW (2011), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110318a1.pdf [hereinafter
2011 CCAR RESULTS].
210
See supra note 207 and accompanying text (introducing the 2009 SCAP
program).
211
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
207
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companies the FSOC designates as their equivalents.212 In 2014, the
FRB combined the ad hoc CCAR program and the new, regular Capital
Plans program into a single program bearing the CCAR name, but now
backed by the express authority of a full-blown notice-and-comment
rulemaking.213 Consequently, today there is no difference between the
212

See supra notes 190 & 192 and accompanying text (discussing (1) the FSOC’s
authority to designate companies as systemically important and to subject those
companies to heightened FRB supervision, including the DFAST and CCAR programs
and (2) the new designation “covered company” that the FRB uses to refer to
companies subject to those programs).
213
For such young programs, the history of the SCAP program, the CCAR
program, the DFAST program, and the Capital Plans program is nothing short of
byzantine. For example, one might reasonably wonder why the FRB continued to
conduct the CCAR program at all in 2012 and 2013—i.e., after the Capital Plans
program, which applied to all the institutions subject to the CCAR, had already
become law in December of 2011. On that score, it bears reminding that the FRB had
been operating the CCAR program since before the Capital Plans rule came into
existence. See 2011 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 209 (dated March 2011, several months
before the FRB promulgated the final Capital Plans rule in December of 2011). In
2012, the first year in which the Capital Plans rule applied, the CCAR and the Capital
Plans program were largely identical in their mechanical details. The innovative
aspects of the latter program were twofold: on the one hand, its scope was wider; and
on the other hand, it formalized the 2011 CCAR process via rulemaking. As for the
new scope, the class of “covered companies” subject to the Capital Plans program was
wider than the class of companies subject to the CCAR, the terms of which applied
only to those companies subject to the initial 2009 SCAP program. See 2012 CCAR
RESULTS, supra note 207, at 4. This discrepancy arose because the CCAR program
incorporated the DFAST supervisory stress tests, which the FRB did not apply to nonSCAP institutions until the stress test cycle commencing on October 1, 2013—i.e., in
connection with the 2014 CCAR program. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.133(a) (2013).
Accordingly, the FRB conducted the 2012 and 2013 Capital Plans programs for only
the eleven covered companies that had not been subject to the SCAP program and, by
implication, were no subject to the CCAR program. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: ASSESSMENT
FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 10 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf [hereinafter 2013 CCAR RESULTS]; 2012
CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 7. The 2011, 2012, and 2013 CCAR programs
applied to the initial SCAP covered companies (nineteen in 2012, but only eighteen
in 2013 because MetLife, Inc. de-registered as a bank holding company). In each of
the CCAR programs that the FRB conducted after it had finalized the Capital Plans
rule, it expressly invoked the Capital Plans rule as authority for the CCAR program.
See, e.g., 2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 1 (“Pursuant to the capital plan rule,
each [covered company] with total consolidated assets of fifty billion dollars or more
is required to submit a capital plan approved by the [covered company’s] board of
directors, or a committee thereof, for the Federal Reserve’s annual CCAR.”). By that
point, the Capital Plans rule had, unlike the CCAR program, become a final rule
following a full notice-and-comment rulemaking. The only technical difference
between the CCAR program (which incorporated the DFAST stress tests) and the pre2014 Capital Plans program is that with the latter, the FRB did not conduct a
supervisory stress test on its own, as it was required to do in connection with the DFAST
stress test program that was incorporated into the CCAR program; instead, these
covered companies conducted their own stress tests, based on the same DFAST
scenarios, and reported the results, which, unlike the DFAST results, were not required
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Capital Plans program and the CCAR program; this Article will refer
to the rule from here on as the CCAR rule, in recognition of the FRB’s
decision to do the same.
In evaluating the capital plan, the FRB assesses whether the
covered company has robust, forward-looking capital planning
processes and sufficient capital to continue operations throughout
times of economic and financial stress.214 Mandatory elements of a
capital plan include: (1) an assessment of the expected uses and
sources of capital over the planning horizon (at least nine quarters,
beginning with the quarter preceding the quarter in which the covered
company submits its capital plan) that reflects the covered company’s
size, complexity, risk profile, and scope of operations, assuming both
expected and stressful conditions; (2) a detailed description of the
covered company’s process for assessing capital adequacy; (3) the
covered company’s capital policy; and (4) a discussion of any expected
changes to the covered company’s business plan that are likely to have
a material impact on its capital adequacy or liquidity.215
A linchpin of the CCAR program is the stress test component that
requires each covered company to estimate projected revenues, losses,
reserves, and pro forma capital levels under a range of stress
scenarios.216 In its rule, the FRB has announced its intention that the
CCAR stress scenarios will “be consistent with” the DFAST stress test
scenarios.217 In practice, the FRB has utilized the exact DFAST stress
test scenarios when conducting each of the CCAR exercises it has
administered to date.218 The rule requires the capital plan to consider
the effects of, in addition to the FRB-formulated stress scenarios, at
least one stress scenario developed by the covered company itself.219
to be publicly disclosed. See 2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra, at 10; 2012 CCAR RESULTS,
supra note 207, at 7. As noted in the text, in 2014, the FRB merged the CCAR program
and the Capital Plans program into a single, unitary CCAR program that applies in an
identical manner to all covered companies—of which there were thirty in 2014. See
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE 1–2 (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131101a2.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS]; 2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 2 (“This
year’s CCAR covered 30 large BHCs, including 12 BHCs that did not participate in
previous CCAR exercises.”).
214
See Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,633.
215
Id. at 74,634.
216
Id. at 74,635.
217
Id.
218
In the 2013 and 2014 CCAR programs, the FRB adopted the DFAST stress
scenarios in their entirety. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND
GUIDANCE 5 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/
bcreg20121109b1.pdf [hereinafter 2013 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS]; 2014 CCAR
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 213, at 7–8.
219
2014 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 213, at 5.
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After reviewing the capital plan, the FRB may approve the plan,
reject the plan, or require re-submission of the plan.220 In coming to
its decision, the FRB takes into account quantitative and qualitative
considerations.221 FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo has described the
qualitative inquiry as “cover[ing] a range of topics, including the extent
to which the design of a firm’s internal scenario captures the specific
risks from the firm’s activities, the firm’s methods for projecting losses
under stress scenarios, and how the firm identifies appropriate capital
levels and plans for distributions.”222 The principal quantitative grounds
for disapproval of a capital plan are that a covered company fails to
demonstrate its ability to maintain a minimum five-percent Tier 1
common ratio223 or other mandatory levels of minimum regulatory
capital224 under the stress test scenarios.225
220

Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,638–41; see also Policy Framework on the
Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,124, 70,125 (2012)
(noting that the CCAR program “ties the review of a bank holding company’s
performance under stress scenarios to its ability to make capital distributions”). The
new CCAR rule makes a process analogous to the PCA regime’s “capital restoration
plan” for “undercapitalized” banks an ongoing feature of banking supervision for all
large banks. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. In this respect, it is also similar
to the new requirement set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act that large banks present “living
wills” for approval by bank supervisors. In each of these cases, lawmakers have
instituted periodic discursive events and settings in which regulatory processes can
engage in continuous learning and adjust dynamically to changing circumstances and
learned experience. See JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 37–44 (1997) (touting
virtues of a “conversational model of regulation”); William H. Simon, Optimization and
Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as an Example, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE
3 (2010).
221
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(2)(ii) (2013).
222
Tarullo Remarks, supra note 189, at 10–11.
223
The CCAR was the first bank regulatory initiative to use the concept of a Tier 1
common capital ratio. Tier 1 common capital is defined as Tier 1 capital less noncommon elements in Tier 1 capital, including perpetual preferred stock and related
surplus, minority interest in subsidiaries, trust preferred securities and mandatory
convertible preferred securities. See Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,636. In
substance, this amounts to common stock plus retained earnings. Since the FRB
promulgated its CCAR rule, it has adopted the so-called “Basel III” capital adequacy
framework, which introduced a new common equity Tier 1 definition. See Regulations
Y and YY: Application of the Revised Capital Framework to the Capital Plan and Stress
Test Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,779, 59,779 (Sept. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.gpo/gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-30/pdf/2013-23618/pdf.
The FRB
anticipates that this new common equity Tier 1 will be even more stringent than the
Tier 1 common ratio established by the CCAR. See id. at 59,781.
224
The other minimum regulatory ratios required by the CCAR rule are the
“common equity tier 1 capital ratio,” the “tier 1 risk-based capital ratio,” the “total riskbased capital ratio,” and the “tier 1 leverage ratio.” 2014 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 213, at 2.
225
2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 11. On the DFAST stress test scenarios,
see supra note 193 and accompanying text. Although the focus of the review is the
projected capital levels under the DFAST stress test scenarios, the FRB in its rule
reserves the right to object to the plan even where the covered company is projected
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If the FRB rejects the capital plan, the covered company is
prohibited from engaging in any “capital distribution,” a category of
transactions defined to include, most obviously, making dividend
payments to stockholders or repurchasing stock.226 In such a case, the
FRB requires the holding company to retain that capital, rather than
distribute it to holding company stockholders.227 The prohibition stays
in effect for four quarters.228 Consequently, the covered company
becomes more resilient to perturbations in the financial markets, and
the FRB might even require it to contribute capital downstream to its
bank subsidiaries under the source-of-strength principle.229
Since 2013, the FRB has given covered companies the opportunity
to revise their proposed capital plans before receiving a final FRB
objection, but such revisions may only include reductions in proposed
dividends or other distributions.230 In any event, however, disapproval
of a capital plan halts dividend payments. If a covered company that
is subject to a capital plan objection wishes to pay higher dividends in
the future, it must wait until the following year, at which point it must
be in a position to demonstrate, either by raising additional capital or
otherwise, its ability to meet the quantitative and qualitative criteria of
the review.231 The remedial actions available to the FRB are narrower
than the remedial actions provided for by the PCA regime,232 but the

to have stressed capital ratios that remain above regulatory minimum levels. See 2012
CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 6.
226
For purposes of its CCAR rule, the FRB defines “capital distribution” as:
[A] redemption or repurchase of any debt or equity capital instrument,
a payment of common or preferred stock dividends, a payment that may
be temporarily or permanently suspended by the issuer on any
instrument that is eligible for inclusion in the numerator of any
minimum regulatory capital ratio, and any similar transaction that the
[FRB] determines to be in substance a distribution of capital.
Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,637; see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(2)(iv) (2015).
227
In the case of the covered companies subject to the CCAR program, the relevant
stockholders are widely dispersed owners of publicly traded stock.
228
See 2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 4.
229
See supra notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text (summarizing the FRB’s sourceof-strength principle and its statutory authorization).
230
See 2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 4; 2013 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 218, at 27.
231
A covered company failing in year one might be able to make such a
demonstration in year two based on internal or external developments (or, more
likely, some mixture of the two). For instance, it could raise additional equity capital
(raising additional debt capital would likely exacerbate any failure to satisfy the
quantitative criteria) or it could reduce its balance sheet or offload assets with high
risk weights. On the other hand, market developments entirely external to the firm
might result in increased reported values for covered company assets (or decreased
loss provisions), such that the company would report higher capital ratios.
232
See supra note 94 (describing remedial actions available to bank supervisors as
bank capital and leverage ratios fall).
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power to restrict capital distributions is particularly meaningful, as it
strikes at the basic value proposition of holding equity securities.233
The critical point here is that whereas the PCA regime triggers
intervention powers based on actual capitalization levels, the CCAR
program triggers intervention powers based on consideration of
hypothetical capitalization levels in the event the stress scenarios come
to pass.234 In the words of the FRB, the new program “incorporates a
forward-looking, post-stress evaluation of a [covered company’s]
capital adequacy.”235
Before these programs, bank regulators lacked a systematized way
of tying dividend regulation to the informal-discretionary dimension
of bank regulation. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, bank supervisors
examined banks’ risk models and stress tests, but they consistently
failed to require banks to change business practices or maintain
additional capital to ensure reliable performance in contingent stress
scenarios, despite their statutory authorities to do so.236 The director
of the now-defunct Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) addressed this
issue in Congressional testimony: “[a]ll of our institutions, all of our
risk management practices, all of our examination approaches work
well, but it is difficult to look at all the risk models and stress them to
unprecedented degrees and then require institutions to operate within
those stress models.”237
Of course, supervisors could always designate any bank action or
inaction uncovered during the examination process an “unsafe or
unsound practice,” but prior to the CCAR program these
determinations would have to be made on an ad hoc basis. Now, the
FRB has instituted a regular procedural mechanism to deliberate on,
formulate, and take into account the effects of hypothetical stress
scenarios on bank capital levels. Moreover, the OTS director’s
testimony alludes to another difficulty: with the largest banks,
supervisors are hesitant to deploy their enforcement arsenal based on
233

See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining how all returns on equity
depend, even if indirectly, on the prospect of payment of dividends to equity owners).
234
The impetus for this shift toward linking minimum capital standards to stress
scenarios came from the Basel Committee’s so-called “Basel 2.5” enhancements in
2009. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II
FRAMEWORK 25 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf
(“Supervisors should challenge banks on how stress testing is used and the way it affects
decision-making. Where this assessment reveals material shortcomings, supervisors should
require a bank to detail a plan of corrective action.”) (emphasis added).
235
2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 1.
236
See supra notes 116, 173 & 174 and accompanying text.
237
Lessons Learned in Risk Management Oversight at Federal Financial Regulators:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Scott M. Polakoff, Acting Director,
Office of Thrift Supervision), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111shrg52966/pdf/CHRG-111shrg52966.pdf.
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hypothetical scenarios. As an illustration of this hesitancy, consider
that none of the largest banks were the subject of any enforcement
proceedings predicated on an unsafe or unsound practice finding in
the five years leading up to the September 2008 financial crisis.238
The novelty of the CCAR regime is not limited to its innovative
combination of two formerly distinct modes of regulation, which is
really an innovation in regulatory theory more than practice. It will
also have significant practical implications. As a practical matter, it will
eclipse the PCA regime as the first regulatory intervention point based
on capital adequacy grounds for large banks.239 This prediction is
straightforward because the stress scenario will necessarily result in a
bank becoming insolvent earlier than it would in actual market
conditions. Unsurprisingly, bank holding companies have taken
notice of the regulatory shift. After all, it is a direct impediment to
returning capital to their stockholders. For all the controversy over
whether managers and boards are responsive to stockholders, the
pressure to pay dividends and engage in share repurchases is an
incontrovertible fact of life for today’s public company.240
Figure 2 below updates the earlier regulatory map by including
the qualitative and quantitative elements of the CCAR program.

238

See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing tendency for supervisors
to avoid finding unsafe and unsound practices at the largest banks).
239
The “based on capital adequacy grounds” qualification is required to take
account of the supervisors’ powers to issue cease-and-desist orders when a bank or
bank holding company engages in an unsafe or unsound practice. See supra note 114
and accompanying text (describing supervisors’ authority to discipline banks and their
executives and boards of directors on safety and soundness grounds even when the
firm is adequately capitalized under the capital adequacy rules).
240
Compare Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 901 (2005) (“At present, all decisions concerning distributions are in
management’s hands.”), and Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (“Conflicts of interest
between shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially severe when
the organization generates substantial free cash flow.”), with LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15–23 (2012) (chronicling the “rise of shareholder
value thinking”), William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1415 (2007) (noting that “hedge funds also intervene on the financial side,
pressuring firms to disgorge cash—either by substantially increasing a regular
dividend, paying a special dividend, or repurchasing stock”), and William W. Bratton
& Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
685 (2010) (“Whether or not cash retention remains a serious governance problem,
the cash-disgorgement agenda registered in boardrooms with unprecedented success
during the later stages of the most recent bull market.”).
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Figure 2: Regulatory Map of U.S. Bank Dividend Regulations
(including the CCAR program)

This map reflects visually the point made throughout this Part VI:
that the CCAR program combines elements of the informaldiscretionary quadrant with elements from the formal-mandatory
quadrant in a new way. The map also shows the qualitative component
of the CCAR as an additional informal-discretionary tool. It differs,
however, from the other informal-discretionary regulatory initiatives
appearing in that quadrant because it has been formalized as a
periodic, recurring feature of bank supervision. As such, it might be
hypothesized that the FRB should utilize it more frequently than its
historically underutilized safety-and-soundness authority. The early
returns on the qualitative component, discussed below, support this
hypothesis.
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B. Early Experience of the CCAR Program
The CCAR program has become one of the key pillars of the U.S.
bank supervisory system. Regulators and industry both acknowledge
its novel importance, and boards of directors manage their companies’
affairs in its shadow.241 JPMorgan Chase & Co., the largest U.S. bank
holding company, describes the new regulatory CCAR regime as the
“primary measure [that it] use[s] to assess capital adequacy.”242 It
further attributes the primacy of regulatory capital to the regulators’
powers to restrict capital distributions: “regulatory capital measures are
the basis upon which the Federal Reserve objects or does not object to
the Firm’s planned capital actions as set forth in the Firm’s CCAR
submission.”243
JPMorgan Chase’s concerns are not merely theoretic. For the
2012 CCAR,244 the FRB objected to the capital plans of four of nineteen
covered companies subject to CCAR245: Ally Financial Inc., Citigroup
Inc., SunTrust Banks, Inc., and MetLife, Inc. Under the severely
adverse stress scenario, the Tier 1 common capital levels246 for three
companies would fall below the new 5.0% threshold if they effectuated
the dividends and other capital distributions as proposed in their
capital plans. For Ally Financial, they would fall from actual levels of
8.0% to 2.5%; for Citigroup, they would decline from 11.7% to 4.9%;
and for SunTrust, they would decline from 9.3% to 4.8%.247 MetLife,
Inc. would maintain Tier 1 common capital levels above 5.0%, but its
Tier 1 leverage ratio would fall to 3.4%, below the regulatory minimum
of 4.0%.248 In each of these cases, the FRB enjoined planned
distributions of corporate funds to stockholders.249
In 2013, the FRB enjoined proposed distributions for two of the
eighteen covered companies subject to the CCAR program: Ally
Financial Inc. and BB&T Corporation. The FRB objected to the
241

See supra note 9 and accompanying text (reporting how Goldman Sachs cut back
its repo lending program because of its preliminary 2014 CCAR results).
242
JPMorgan 10-K, supra note 8, at 117.
243
Id.
244
See supra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining that the CCAR program
was the programmatic vehicle through which the FRB conducted the Capital Plans
program for the largest bank holding companies, but that the Capital Plans program
has since 2014 been subsumed into a now unitary CCAR program).
245
For an explanation for why only nineteen covered companies were subject to
the CCAR program, see supra note 213.
246
See supra note 224 and accompanying text (listing minimum capital adequacy
ratio requirements that must be met under the stress scenarios pursuant to the CCAR
program).
247
2012 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 24.
248
Id. (noting MetLife, Inc.’s 3.4% leverage ratio); see also id. at 26 n.24.
249
See Peter Eavis & J.B. Silver-Greenberg, 15 of 19 Big Banks Pass Fed’s Latest Stress
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2012, at B1; 2012 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 24 tbl.2.
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former’s plan on quantitative and qualitative grounds.250 In particular,
in the severely adverse stress scenario, Ally Financial’s Tier 1 common
equity ratio decreased from 7.33% to 1.78% after giving effect to its
proposed distributions.251 In BB&T’s case, the FRB objected to the
plan on qualitative reasons alone.252 These qualitative reasons related
to BB&T’s public disclosure that it was reevaluating the process by
which it calculated its risk-weighted assets—a key input for one of the
regulatory capital levels tested in the CCAR program—to comply with
applicable regulatory guidance concerning its treatment of unfunded
lending commitments.253
In each of these cases, the FRB objected to and enjoined
dividends or other distributions of capital where the covered company
was “well capitalized” according to each of the PCA regulatory capital
requirements to which it was subject.254 The objection was premised
on the covered company’s predicted inability to maintain its “well
capitalized” status if a stress scenario were to occur. With the CCAR
program (and the DFAST stress tests it incorporates), the regulatory
lens has shifted from snapshot assessments of actual capital levels to
forward-looking assessments based on contingent, conjectural, and
hypothetical future world states. By limiting the ability to declare
dividends or otherwise distribute corporate property—which, again, is
the essential characteristic of a privately funded banking system255—the
FRB has rendered bank dividends more contingent and contestable
than ever before.
The 2014 CCAR Results ushered in a new era for two reasons.
First, the scope of the program expanded; thirty covered companies
met the statutory threshold for participation,256 up from eighteen the
year before.257
Second, the FRB significantly ramped up its
enforcement efforts to discipline banks on qualitative grounds. The
FRB rejected the capital plans of four banks due to what the FRB
determined were deficient corporate governance systems with respect
to capital planning. As for the quantitative component of the

250

On the FRB’s authority to object to a capital plan for qualitative or quantitative
grounds, see supra note 221 and accompanying text.
251
2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 16.
252
Id. at 6.
253
Id. at 20.
254
For a discussion of the importance of the “well capitalized” definition to the
prompt corrective action regime, see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
255
See supra Part II (explaining importance of dividends to a privatized financial
system).
256
All bank holding companies with assets in excess of fifty billion dollars, as well
as all entities designated by the FSOC as systemically important, must participate in
the CCAR program. See supra notes 190 & 200 and accompanying text.
257
See 2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 2. For a full discussion of the scope
of application of the CCAR program, see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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program, the FRB continued to restrict dividend payments for banks
failing to maintain requisite capital ratios over the severely adverse
scenario.
The FRB objected to four banks’ capital plans on qualitative
grounds. The FRB’s most significant objection was that of Citigroup,
which once again found itself the subject of an FRB objection.258 In
objecting to Citigroup’s planned increase of its annual dividend from
four cents to twenty cents,259 the FRB noted that, consistent with a 2012
policy statement, it had heightened expectations of “financial
resiliency”260 of the largest, most important financial institutions.261
The FRB highlighted “deficiencies” in the bank’s abilities “to project
revenue and losses under a stressful scenario for material parts of the
firm’s global operations” and “to develop scenarios for its internal
stress testing that adequately reflect and stress its full range of business
activities and exposures.”262 The FRB noted that it had previously
brought these deficiencies to Citigroup managers’ attention during its
supervisory examinations of the holding company system.263
The three other covered companies that received objections to
their capital plans—Santander Holdings USA, Inc., RBS Citizens
Financial Group, Inc., and HSBC North America Holdings Inc.—are
the U.S. holding companies for banks headquartered outside of the
United States.264 For RBS Citizens and HSBC, the FRB echoed its
concerns with Citigroup. These banks had deficient practices for
estimating revenues and losses under a stress scenario; in the process,
they failed to demonstrate their ability to plan for a recession.265 The
FRB found that Santander’s problems ran deeper, describing the
bank’s capital planning deficiencies as “widespread and significant.”266
In fact, the FRB’s results for Santander lamented nearly every
important aspect of its stress scenario planning: “governance, internal
controls, risk identification and management, management

258

See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s rejection of
Citigroup’s 2012 capital plan on quantitative grounds).
259
See Stephanie Armour et al., Fed Kills Citi Plan to Pay Investors, WALL ST. J., Mar.
27, 2014, at A1 (reporting that Citigroup executives were surprised by the objection,
and had believed the proposed dividend increase was “modest”).
260
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR NO. 12-17, CONSOLIDATED
SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf.
261
2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 7.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
See id. at 6.
265
Id. at 7.
266
Id.
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information system[s], and assumptions and analysis that support [its]
capital planning processes.”267
Zions Bancorporation was the only bank to receive an objection
on quantitative grounds in 2014. Its Tier 1 common ratio for the
severely adverse scenario was 4.4%, short of the 5.0% standard.
Consistent with past practice, the FRB provided preliminary results of
its CCAR exercise to the covered companies. The Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. and Bank of America Inc., two of the five largest U.S.-based
bank holding companies,268 received preliminary word from the FRB
that it would reject their capital plans on quantitative grounds if they
were left unchanged.269 If those banks were to pay out dividends as
proposed in their initial capital plan submissions, their leverage ratios
would have fallen below the required minimum levels in the severely
adverse scenario. In response to the preliminary objection, Bank of
America and Goldman pared back their planned distribution of
dividends.270 In light of the close call, Goldman Sachs also elected to
preserve its future flexibility and reduce its likelihood of receiving a
future objection by shrinking its total assets.271 Here, the FRB
demonstrated its ability to conceive of dividend regulation in less
formal terms—as a dialogic and conversational regulatory model that
occurs in the shadow of the FRB’s more prescriptive powers.272
The conduct of the CCAR program over the past three years has
reinvigorated dividend regulation—a largely forgotten feature of U.S.
banking regulation, at least for the largest banks—and made it a salient
component of the bank supervisory apparatus. In administering the
program, the FRB has restricted the ability of ten of the largest bank
holding companies in the world to pay dividends to their
267

Id.
See Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR.,
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx (last visited
Oct. 2, 2015) (providing list of largest financial holding companies as of March 31,
2014).
269
2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 9, 13 tbl.6.A, 32 tbl.A.4.A (noting in
particular that under the severely adverse stress scenario, Goldman Sachs would see its
Tier 1 leverage ratio drop to 3.9% (below the 4.0% standard) and Bank of America
would see its Tier 1 leverage ratio fall to 3.9% and its Tier 1 capital ratio fall below the
6.0% standard).
270
See Michael J. Moore & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Citigroup Fails Fed Stress Test as BofA
Gets Dividend Boost, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 27, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-26/citigroup-fails-fed-stress-test-as-goldman-bofamodify-plans.html (“[Bank of America and Goldman Sachs] asked for too much in
buybacks and dividends after their own internal stress tests showed better performance
than in the central bank’s exam.”).
271
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (reporting how Goldman Sachs cut back
its repo lending program because of its preliminary 2014 CCAR results). See infra
notes 27779 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of how Bank of America
and Goldman Sachs responded to the FRB’s 2014 preliminary objection.
272
See BLACK, supra note 220, at 37–44.
268
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stockholders.273 Moreover, by instituting the CCAR program as an
ongoing feature of bank supervision, the FRB has formally made all
large bank holding company dividends contingent on regulatory
approval. Although the FRB has possessed the authority—since 1966,
at any rate274—to restrict dividends and other distributions where a
bank or bank holding company is engaging in unsafe or unsound
practices, this new program systematizes and formalizes this intrusion
into the corporate governance of the banking sector. Moreover, it
does so without requiring the supervisor to demonstrate that the bank
is engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice. Instead, the regulatory
intervention is predicated on a bank’s failure to demonstrate that its
practices, however facially safe and sound, are sufficient to secure
stable, continued, and resilient operation in the event that a stress
scenario, formulated by the supervisors, were to transpire.
The CCAR program affects the decisional landscape for covered
companies in ways that extend well beyond dividend policy. It also
alters the ex ante incentive structure for covered company
management. Because boards and executives manage their firms in
light of their expectations of the future, the CCAR program can force
management into choosing between two strategy types. These strategy
types involve incremental trade-offs; that is, they are not mutually
exclusive and can be contemporaneously adopted in combination to
varying degrees. The first strategy type is simple: management can
adjust its planned dividends and distributions in recognition of the
possible, or likely, rejection of its capital plan. Under the second
alternative, management can adjust its existing strategy by re-allocating
asset portfolios or raising new capital, so as to maximize its chances of
avoiding a rejection and preserving its ability to distribute capital to
stockholders. Any informal model of these decisional incentives must
also take into consideration whether the FRB continues its practice of
notifying covered companies preliminarily of its intent to object to a
submitted plan, or whether management learns of an FRB objection
only when it is publicly, and definitively, disclosed. Under either of
these scenarios, however, management will be confronted with two
possible strategy types in the shadow of the threat of the FRB objection.
To appreciate how this process unfolds, consider the choices
facing management of a covered company that suspects the FRB might
object to its plans (1) to pay a quarterly dividend of $0.75 to its
stockholders and (2) to spin out (that is, distribute) an insurance
division to its stockholders. First, the company could simply reduce its

273

In the cases of Bank of America and Goldman Sachs, the mandates were
provisional; once these banks revised their capital plan submissions, the FRB
authorized their proposed distributions to stockholders. See supra note 270 and
accompanying text.
274
See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
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planned dividend or scupper the planned spin out. Although on the
surface this course of action solves a procedural problem with the
regulator, in practice it formally cements a more fundamental,
economically substantive problem the company was trying to avoid:
regulatory intervention with planned corporate actions and policies.
Alternatively, the company could adjust its strategies with respect to
non-dividend policies. For example, the company might change its
investment strategy by substituting low-risk loans for a portion of highly
risky assets.275 Technically, this course of action would produce two
computational effects, each of which would increase the company’s
likelihood of passing the CCAR test. First, it would lower the
company’s “risk-weighted assets,” in the process decreasing the
denominator of its capital adequacy ratio.276 In other words, it would
be easier for the company to demonstrate higher capital ratios, thereby
complying with regulatory minimum, because the equation’s
denominator would have decreased. Second, it would attenuate the
adverse effects of the stress scenarios on the bank’s reconstructed,
hypothetical balance sheet. While this example imagines de-risking by
asset substitution, the company would achieve similar alchemy by
simply reducing total assets by borrowing less. Therefore, a covered
company can avoid an FRB objection of its planned distributions by
decreasing the risk-weighted assets denominator through de-risking its
asset portfolio.
It is not possible to know exactly how the program, in practice,
impacts managerial decision outcomes because covered companies are
not required to disclose, and understandably choose not to volunteer,
internal deliberations of this sort. The experience of Goldman Sachs
and Bank of America in 2014 is, however, instructive. As noted earlier,
the FRB preliminarily notified Goldman Sachs and Bank of America
that the 2014 CCAR results would disclose their failure to maintain
leverage ratios and (in Bank of America’s case) Tier 1 capital ratios
above applicable regulatory minimums under the severely adverse
scenario.277 The FRB permitted the two companies to submit adjusted
capital plans. The resubmitted plans were confidential, but the
salience of the event resulted in significant media attention, and some
275

The following description explicates how the CCAR program carries forward
the “risk tax” effect of capital requirements into the hypothetical, future-oriented
realm of the informal-discretionary dimension. See, e.g., Sun Bae Kim & Ramon
Moreno, Stock Prices and Bank Lending Behavior in Japan, I ECON. REV. FED. RESERVE BANK
S.F. 31, 3334 (1994) (noting that where the supply of equity finance is imperfectly
elastic and temporal limitations for accumulating retained earnings as equity exist, an
institution will likely be required to reduce its risk-weighted assets to maintain
acceptable capital ratios).
276
See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22632
(2013) for a description of capital adequacy regulation that is both technical and
concise.
277
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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details emerged about the companies’ responses. In its adjusted
capital plan, Bank of America reduced its planned dividends, leaving
it with more capital and a higher leverage ratio.278 Goldman Sachs, on
the other hand, not only reduced its planned distributions, it also shed
assets to boost its leverage ratio and reduce the risk of running into the
same situation the following CCAR cycle.279 From the perspective of
the FRB, the end results were similar: Bank of America became more
resilient by retaining rather than distributing capital, and Goldman
Sachs became more resilient by taking the further step of de-leveraging
its balance sheet. One of the more interesting trends to track in
banking supervision is whether the FRB will continue this dialogic
practice of providing preliminary results to banks whose capital plans
come close, but not do not meet, the regulatory capital minimums
under the severely adverse scenario. No matter what the FRB does with
respect to preliminary results, the threat of a CCAR capital plan
rejection can be expected to alter the ex ante incentive structure for
covered company management, thereby impacting beyond dividend
policies to core matters of strategy and economic capital allocation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Dividend restrictions have been a part of bank regulation in the
United States since the Civil War when Congress enacted the National
Bank Act, the first initial general incorporation statute for banks. In
today’s financial markets, these rigid, formulaic, accounting-based
dividend restrictions (and their progeny) are anachronisms. The
endemic instability of today’s banking environment requires a
different regulatory approach that considers how regulatory objectives
can be promoted in an uncertain and volatile future. But the
regulation of dividends, if it can be implemented in an effective
manner, remains a useful tool on account of its simplicity: by
restricting the ability of banks and their holding companies to transfer
capital to stockholders, they ensure that there is greater loss absorbing
capital within the enterprise.
With the DFAST stress tests and the CCAR program, the FRB and
Congress should be applauded for having taken steps to do just that.
These initiatives are noteworthy for two reasons. The first reason is a
matter of rationalist, regulatory technique. Regulators have opted to
update the anachronistic system in an effort to rehabilitate the logical
connection between the regulatory means (dividend regulation) and
the regulatory ends (a more resilient and stable banking system). The
278

See Andrew Dunn, Bank of America to Increase its Dividend for First Time Since
Financial Crisis, CHARLOTTE OBS., Mar. 26, 2014 (reporting that Bank of America “had
to revise down the level of capital it would return to shareholders” in response to the
FRB’s preliminary objection to its capital plan).
279
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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second reason matters from a regulatory theory perspective. With its
new CCAR program, the FRB unites the informal-discretionary and
formal-mandatory dimensions of bank supervision. Specifically, it has
adopted the informal-discretionary element of imaginative and
counterfactual thinking. But by retaining a binary pass-fail mechanism
calibrated to regulatory capital ratios, the CCAR program remains
tethered to traditional formal-mandatory modes of regulation.
Consequently, U.S. bank capital regulation has become a “risk
regulatory” regime, a type of regulatory system that has prevailed for
decades in other contexts such as environmental, health, and safety
regulation. This observation should prompt future research to inquire
into how the traditional risk regulation literature sheds light on bank
supervisory tasks, as well as how risk regulation in the financial
supervision context might differ from the traditional contexts in which
the risk regulatory model has taken hold. Bearing in mind that one of
the central purposes of financial institutions is to produce information
about, purchase, and trade risk, this latter consideration opens a
discussion about a new risk regulation of risk-taking, a theme that has
not been examined.

